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Leadership in stressful and dangerous situations is vitally important in terms of lives, 
property, and national strategic objectives. But our understanding of effective leadership 
in these and other contexts is limited. Part of the problem is that interactionist theoretical 
perspectives are not reflected in contemporary leadership thinking. In addition, the 
impact of individual differences on leadership is often misrepresented or hidden by linear 
correlations and regressions conducted on continuous scores. This study employed new, 
innovative, indirect conditional reasoning measures to assess the personalities of 627 
leaders entering the military’s most challenging and stressful combat leader development 
course (the US Army Ranger School). These innovative measures predicted compelling 
differences in leadership, attrition, and in the peer evaluations made during the training. 
Analyses conducted on the continuous personality scores demonstrate that these findings 
are misrepresented or hidden by linear correlations and regressions. As an alternative, I 
present a configural scoring scheme, couched in a poker analogy, to explain how these 
individual differences combine to predict the odds of success for each of the 18 





LEADERSHIP: THE LAND INTERACTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY FORGOT 
For more than a century, behavioral scientists have sought to understand, predict, and 
develop effective leadership.1 They began by investigating simple traits (e.g. Stogdill, 
1948; Mann, 1959). Rejecting that line of research, attention turned toward studying 
leader knowledge, skills, experience and leader behaviors such as ‘consideration’ and 
‘initiating structure’ (e.g. Hemphill, 1950; Katz, Maccoby, & Morse, 1950; Fleishman, 
1995). Obtaining useful findings, researchers shifted their attention toward situational 
variables and ‘contingency theories’ (e.g. Vroom & Yetton, 1973; House & Mitchell, 
1974; Hersey & Blanchard, 1977).  More contemporary leadership theories focus on 
leader-follower relationships (e.g. Danserau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen, 1995), 
‘leadership styles’ (e.g. Bass, 1985; Avolio, Bass, & Jung, 1999), and ‘shared leadership’ 
(e.g. Bowers  & Seashore, 1966; Day, Gronn, & Salas, 2004).2 
This progression has taken place against a backdrop of broader, thematic change 
in psychological thought (e.g. behaviorism, cognitivism, and more recently 
interactionism). Contemporary behavioral science broadly embraces interactionism and 
multifactorial causation, but contemporary leadership theories largely decline to measure 
fundamental individual differences (e.g. abilities, traits, implicit motives) in leaders, 
subordinate leaders, or followers. If situational factors are considered at all, they 
                                                 
 
 
1 In this manuscript leadership is discussed in accordance with common terminology distinguishing 
between “Attempted”, “Successful”, and “Effective” leadership (Hemphill, 1958; Bass, 1960; Hemphill, 
1961). 
2 For detailed reviews, see Yukl (2006) or Smith (2011, pp. 3-35). 
2 
primarily function to prescribe the specific leader behaviors and styles that psychologists 
believe are situationally optimal (Smith, 2011, pp. 16-20). Given these facts, it seems 
reasonable to assert that contemporary leadership theories are not interactional in any 
substantive way. In fact, the sole major leadership theorist to postulate interactions 
between fundamental individual differences and situational factors was Fiedler (1967), 
who showed that an indirect measure of personality-defining motives (i.e. Least Preferred 
Coworker or ‘LPC’) interacted with situational variables to influence leader behaviors, 
follower behaviors, and organizational effectiveness (Smith, 2011, pp. 20-25). In my 
view, at least two obstacles inhibit the progress of interactionist perspectives in the study 
of leadership. First, the impacts of fundamental individual differences are often 
misrepresented or hidden by linear combinations, correlations and regressions conducted 
on raw or standardized scores. Second, in many cases, the positive and negative impacts 
of leader individual differences are domain specific.  
Obstacle I: Simplistic Analyses and Linear Combinations 
The writings of Stogdill (1948; 1974) are often cited as turning points, i.e. when 
leadership science began to turn its back on trait theories3. However, often ignored by 
modern citations of Stogdill’s work, is his conclusion that while leader traits are 
important, so are situations and the attributes of followers:  
‘Reviews by Bird, Jenkins, and Stogdill have been cited frequently as evidence that 
leadership is entirely situational in origin and that no personal characteristics are 
predictive of leadership. This view overemphasizes the situational and underemphasizes 
                                                 
 
 
3Mann (1959) is also often cited as a deathblow for trait theories of leadership. In the following pages, I 
argue that Stogdill’s conclusions are often misrepresented. Different but compelling arguments are 
available elsewhere concerning Mann. See Lord, De Vader, & Alliger (1986, pp. 402-403). 
3 
the personal nature of leadership. Strong evidence indicates that the behaviors and traits 
enabling a mobster to gain and maintain control over a criminal gang are not the same as 
those enabling a religious leader to gain and maintain a large following. Yet certain 
general qualities characterize both.’ (Stogdill, 1974, p. 72). 
In fact Stogdill, among others, argued for an interactionist perspective:  
‘[Research indicates that leaders] do indeed exhibit personality, and personality is an 
important factor in emergence as a leader and in maintaining the role. Early theoretical 
attempts to define leadership in terms of personality produced a reaction in which some 
writers denied the importance of this quality …leader characteristics and situational 
demands interact to determine the extent to which a given leader will prove successful’ 
(Stogdill, 1974, p. 411). 
Stogdill advocated for conditional, non-linear, and multivariate hypotheses over more 
simplistic conceptualizations (Stogdill, 1974, p. 407; see also p. 44, 78, 82, and 406). 
Supporting his argument were studies of general traits, abilities, and personality. For 
example, Stogdill reviewed 33 studies investigating the relationship of intelligence to 
leadership. All but four found that leaders surpass followers in intelligence and that high 
intelligence was associated with other characteristics (i.e. wisdom, maturity, 
perseverance, alertness, and conscientiousness) which contribute to a person’s value as a 
leader (Stogdill, 1974, p. 44). Stogdill further concluded that “one of the most significant 
findings concerning the relationship of intelligence to leadership is that extreme 
discrepancies between the intelligence of leaders and their potential followers militate 
against the exercise of leadership’ (Stogdill, 1974, p. 44). Hollingworth described his 
findings: “among children with a mean IQ of 100, the IQ of the leader is likely to fall 
between 115 and 130. That is, the leader is likely to be more intelligent, but not too much 
more intelligent than the average of the group led.” (Hollingworth, 1926, quoted by 
Stogdill, 1974, p.44). Theoretical explanations for the observed curvilinear relationship 
focused on social and communication difficulties which grew as the gap in intelligence 
between potential leader and followers widened (Stogdill, 1974, p. 44). Identical findings 
4 
exist regarding intelligence-leadership relationships in adult work settings (see Ghiselli, 
1963; Riggio, Murphy, & Pirozzolo, 2002, p. 2). 
 This pattern of results illustrates several conceptual and methodological problems 
which obscure the relationships between traits (e.g. intelligence and personality) and 
effective leadership. When these relationships have been discounted, the analysis 
commonly suffers from several of the following: a) measures of leader traits are not 
considered in relation to those of followers, despite evidence that trait differentials 
between leaders and led are impactful; b) the assumption is made that the relationships 
between leader traits and effective leadership are linear, when there are compelling 
reasons to believe this is not necessarily so; c) the interpretation of results discounts the 
fact that the measures selected were limited in scope, neglecting important aspects of the 
construct that are at the root of that trait-leadership relationship; and/or d) the analysis 
and interpretation ignores heteroscedasticity in the criterion distribution. 
 To expand on points a) and b), above: a pattern of results similar to that already 
discussed for intelligence exists in the realm of personality. For example, personality trait 
differentials between leader and followers were shown to relate to group behavior and 
performance. Disruptive behavior and decision-making effectiveness were shown to vary 
systemically across groups as a function of authoritarian-equalitarian leader-follower 
personality combinations (Frey, 1963, cited by Stogdill, 1974. p.108). An extensive 
program of research investigating leadership in military groups under stress (in survival 
training) found that irreconcilable differences in leader-follower values and personality 
jeopardize group survival in military operations (Torrance, 1961, pp. 111-112). Stogdill 
concluded that, in effective leadership, the personal characteristics of the leader are 
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related to the characteristics and goals of followers (Stogdill, 1948, pp. 64-65) (also see 
Bass, 1960, pp. 18, 177-178; Van Kleef, Homan, Beersma, & van Knippenberg, 2010). 
Further, Bass et al. found that both individuals scoring high and those scoring low on 
personality tests for authoritarianism were equally ineffective in leaderless group 
discussions. Those with moderate scores were most influential (Bass, McGehee, 
Hawkins, Young, & Gebel, 1953). Similar conclusions were reached in a study of leader 
personality, leader acceptance and group cohesion among Air Force enlisted men 
(Medalia, 1955). Finally, the results of 11 studies reviewed by Stogdill showed that 
leaders were more dominant and ascendant; but in four studies “bossy” and 
“domineering” personalities were rejected as leaders (Stogdill, 1974, p. 50). Aristotle, 
tutor to Alexander the Great, observed: “Anyone can become angry – that is easy. But to 
be angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, 
and in the right way – that is not easy” (Aristotle, quoted by Army FM22-100, 1999, pp. 
2-17). Aristotle observed that effective leaders are neither dominated by emotionality, nor 
devoid of it. Additionally, situational and follower differences are important. Aristotle 
might find it curious that since his time the relationships between leader traits and 
effective leadership have been assumed to be linear, and leader-follower trait differentials 
have been largely ignored.  
 To expand on point c), above: empirical analyses of trait-leadership relationships 
often measure selected aspects of a trait (e.g. mathematical and verbal intelligence) while 
ignoring aspects of that trait (e.g. forms of social intelligence) that are at the root of that 
trait-leadership relationship (Riggio et al., 2002, p. 2; Zaccaro, 2002, 2007). Restating 
this example in the realm of personality: we often measure selected aspects of personality 
6 
(e.g. traits such as: conscientiousness and extroversion) while ignoring important aspects 
of personality (e.g. implicit motives such as: power motive, achievement and aggression) 
which are also at the root of the relationship between personality and effective 
leadership.4,5   
To expand on point d), above: ignoring heteroscedasticity in the criterion 
distributions misses the fact that leader traits (e.g. intelligence and personality) contribute 
to and enable group performance but do not guarantee it. Unmeasured leader, follower, 
organizational and situational factors often cause failure in spite of how smart, 
achievement-oriented, influential, and pro-social the leader is (Voiers, 1953; Kerr & 
Jermier, 1978; Podsakoff, Mackenzie, & Bommer, 1996). In contrast, the effectiveness of 
groups led by stupid, timid, narcissistic, and excessively coercive people is uniformly low 
(Chidester, Helmreich, Gregorich, & Gels, 1991; Williams, 2005; Babiak & Hare, 2006; 
Sutton, 2007). For these reasons (a-d, above), the impact of leader traits is often observed 
as increased variance in the criterion distribution, located in relation to a ‘sweet spot’ in 
the predictor (noting that predictors may sometimes take the form of trait differentials 
between the leader and the led). In sum, the impacts of leader individual differences are 
often misrepresented or hidden by linear combinations, simple correlations or regressions 
conducted on raw or standardized scores. 
                                                 
 
 
4 Yukl joins others in differentiating between “personality traits” which are “relatively stable dispositions to 
behave in a particular way”, and social motives which are relatively stable desires “for particular types of 
stimuli or experiences …such as achievement, affiliation, power”. Motives are “important because they 
influence attention …and guide, energize, and sustain behavior” (Yukl, 1998, p. 234)  (see also: Allport, 
1937; Ghiselli, 1968; James & Mazerolle, 2002). 
5 Also see Judge, Colbert, & Ilies (2004, p. 548), who discuss that observed single trait-leadership 
relationships may be of limited size because traits function in combination, “[if a leader is to be effective, 
she] must possess the intelligence to make effective decisions, the dominance to convince others, the 
achievement motivation to persist…” 
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Obstacle II: Domain Specificity 
We’ve known for some time that the impact of individual differences on leader 
and organizational effectiveness is domain specific (Stogdill, 1974, p. 72).  That is, the 
combinations of individual differences which are a cause of effective leadership often 
depend on the situation and on those led. Further, if we are to study leadership in any 
domain, we must have valid measures of leader and/or organizational effectiveness 
relative to that of similarly situated peers and competitors (Hogan, 1994, p. 10; Hogan & 
Kaiser, 2005, pp. 172, 176-177). Studies meeting that requirement are few and far 
between (Hogan, 1994, pp. 11-12). To further underscore the importance of an 
interactional approach, prominent thinkers indicate that the valid measurement of leader 
and organizational effectiveness requires extensive knowledge of the domain (Hogan, 
1994, p. 10; Kozlowski & Bell, 2003, p. 346). 
In sum, empirical studies of leader individual differences which are not rooted in 
a specific leadership domain (or that lack a deep understanding of the chosen domain) 
tend to employ poor dependent measures. In addition, they tend to treat individual 
differences in an ‘atomistic fashion’, suggesting that individual traits act singly and 
linearly to effect leadership (Stogdill, 1974, p. 82). Failures like these are common in 
trait-leadership research, and they join a longer list of conceptual and methodological 
issues enjoining a better understanding of effective leadership, e.g. the criterion problem, 
multi-level effects, the importance of time, etc. (for more complete discussions, see: 
Hogan, 1994; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000; Mitchell & James, 2001; Zaccaro & Klimoski, 
2001; Avolio, Sosik, Jung, & Berson, 2003; Yukl, 2006; Zaccaro, 2007, pp. 6-7).  
8 
In spite of such challenges, the contribution of traits (such as intelligence and 
personality) to effective leadership remains worthy of investigation. Stogdill wrote:  
‘the conclusion that personality is a factor in leadership differentiation does not represent 
a return to the trait approach. It does represent a sensible modification of the extreme 
situationist point of view. …[Early trait theories] suggested that individual traits acted 
singly and linearly to effect leadership. [In contrast,] the situationist approach denied the 
influence of individual differences’ (Stogdill, 1974, p. 82).  
Yet forty years later, behavioral science largely neglects to investigate leadership from an 
interactional perspective. Perhaps modern theories of leadership effectiveness should 
acknowledge that effective leaders are not only both “born” and “made”, i.e. nurtured, 
mentored, educated, trained, inspired, and resourced (Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal, 
& Tellegen, 1990, p. 227; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991; Yukl, 1998, p. 234; Avolio et al., 
2003, pp. 290-292), but they also exist within specific domains. 
Rationale for this Study 
In the absence of an interactional theoretical perspective, contemporary leadership 
theories essentially advise would-be leaders to behave in certain ways (i.e. to adopt 
certain styles). For example, leaders are encouraged to: 1) establish cooperative, 
interdependent relationships, 2) demonstrate their personal competence, and 3) 
demonstrate their good character (Deutsch, 1958; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Deutsch, 
1962; Gibb, 1964; Zand, 1972; Deutsch, 1973; Roberts & O'Reilly, 1974; Golembiewski 
& McConkie, 1975; Gabarro, 1978; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1998; Sweeney, Thompson, & Blanton, 2009; Sweeney, 2010). Other 
theories encourage leaders to be ‘transformational’ (i.e. ‘charismatic’, ‘inspirational’, 
‘intellectually stimulating’, ‘individually considerate’ and broadly pro-social); or to 
employ ‘the full range’ of leadership styles (including ‘transactional’, ‘management by 
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exception’, ‘permissive’, and ‘laissez-faire’) (Bass, 1985; Avolio & Bass, 1991; Howell 
& Avoilio, 1993; Bass, 1997; Bass & Avoilio, 1997; Avolio et al., 1999; Bass, 2002).  
These theories assume: 1) would-be leaders know how to behave in these ways, 2) would-
be leaders want, and are able, to behave in these ways (i.e. that they have the cognitive 
capacity, motivation, and volition to control their behavior over time in the manner 
prescribed by psychologists), and 3) that followers respond positively to leaders who 
behave that way, regardless of the situation.  
While all three assumptions invite challenge, the first two are especially 
questionable in light of a growing body of research highlighting the limits of human 
cognitive capacity, volition, and rationality. As scientists investigate the interaction of 
implicit and explicit, affective and rational, and controlled and uncontrolled behavioral 
processes, the emerging view sees motives and emotions as bases for reason, and pivotal 
behavioral processes as being relatively implicit and automatic.6 This aspect of human 
nature is especially apparent when people are under stress (Strauss, 1944; Stogdill, 1974; 
Keinan, 1984; Fiedler & Garcia, 1987; Fiedler, 1990; Smith, 1990; Gohm, Baumann, & 
Sniezek, 2001; Fiedler, 2002; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Smith, 2011). 
Given these findings, it seems reasonable to consider the implications of 
personality-defining implicit motives for leadership. A large body of theoretical and 
empirical work describes implicit motives as the ‘unconscious needs and aversions’ (i.e. 
                                                 
 
 
6 An extensive body of research documents the evolution of this view (e.g. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Marcel, 1983; McClelland, 1985; Kunda, 1990; 
Westen, 1991; James, 1998; Westen, 1998; Winter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998; Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999; Bargh, 2001; Haidt, 2001; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & 
Welch, 2001; Zajonc, 2001; James & Mazerolle, 2002; Kehr, 2004; Nowlis & Shiv, 2005; Shiv, 
Loewenstein, & Bechara, 2005; Reyna & Farley, 2006; Baumeister, Vols, & Tice, 2007; Clore & 
Huntsinger, 2007; Bargh, 2008a, 2008b; Barsalou, 2008; Bargh, 2009). 
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the drives) that ‘energize, guide, and sustain’ human behavior (Allport, 1937; Murray, 
1938; Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1985; James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; Winter, 
2002; James et al., 2005; Yukl, 2006; James et al., 2011, in press).  For example, 
individuals possessing an implicit power motive should be implicitly biased toward 
behaving in ways which gain them control and influence, and biased against behaving in 
ways which detract from their influence (Smith, 2011; James et al., 2011, in press). 
Further, they would be implicitly motivated across their life-span (and particularly in 
evocative contexts) to develop and present themselves in ways that enhance their 
influence (Smith, 2011). So, if follower perceptions of competence and good character 
increase leader influence, then leaders implicitly motivated by power would be driven to 
develop and display these qualities. Further, leaders implicitly motivated by power might 
be ‘intellectually stimulating’ and ‘individually considerate’ when followers and the 
situation make these behaviors adaptive. But they may ‘simplify complex issues’ and 
‘treat people consistently’ when followers or the situation make these behaviors adaptive.  
Briefly stated, research supports the assertion that leader implicit motives (e.g. 
power, achievement, and aggression) influence organizational climate and effectiveness 
(Fiedler, 1967; Ghiselli, 1968; Moreland & Levine, 1982; Bass, 1985; McClelland, 1985; 
Schneider, 1987; Schneider, Goldstein, & Smith, 1995; Hogan & Hogan, 1996; 
Schneider, Smith, & Goldstein, 2000; Bass, 2002; Hogan & Hogan, 2002; James & 
Mazerolle, 2002; Winter, 2002; James et al., 2005; Morris, Brotheridge, & Urbanski, 
2005; Bing et al., 2007; Frost, Ko, & James, 2007; Smith, 2011; and James et al., 2011, in 
press; James & Meyer, 2011, in press). Those with strong motives for power and 
achievement are expected to build more effective teams than those who lack an implicit 
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power motive, are avoidant, and/or overly aggressive. Further, implicit motives are 
expected to have stronger implications for leadership in situations where ‘mortality 
salience’ and ‘stress’ are high, ‘situational strength’ is low or dynamic, and cognitive 
capacity is taxed (e.g. in a combat zone, see Smith, 2011). 
In sum, much has been done to document ‘what effective leaders do’, both in 
terms of their specific behaviors and in terms of their behavioral styles. Unfortunately, 
relatively little has been accomplished to understand and measure the factors which 
explain ‘why they behave that way’ (and why other leaders with similar training, in 
similar situations, do not). We have learned much about leadership in the past century, 
but in the absence of an interactionist theoretical perspective, theorists struggle to define 
and measure pivotal contemporary constructs such as leader ‘authenticity’ (Bass, 1960, 
pp. 318-322; Bass, 2002, p. 113; Bedeian & Day, 2004; Smith, 2011). While the base rate 
of leader incompetence in America is estimated at 60% (Hogan, Raskin, & Fazzini, 1990; 
Hogan, 1994, p. 12; Tepper, 2000; Harvey, Stoner, Hochwarter, & Kacmar, 2007; 
Tierney & Tepper, 2007), leadership development consultants consume nearly $45 billion 
annually, often without measured success (Gomez, 2007; Avolio & Hannah, 2008; Coutu 
& Kauffman, 2009; Avolio, Avey, & Quisenberry, 2010). More useful theories are 
needed. 
More useful theories may eventually specify the interactions between important 
leader, follower, and situational variables but such an approach requires that critical 
leader, follower, and situational constructs be defined and measured. Since contemporary 
leadership theories largely ignore fundamental individual differences, convincing 
thinkers to shift their theoretical perspective towards interactionism will require 
12 
compelling evidence that individual differences beyond abilities and Five Factor Model-
style personality traits are a cause of effective leadership. This in mind, the measurement 
of implicit motives via conditional reasoning represents a promising new approach, and 
an opportunity to study important individual differences which are expected to help 
explain effective leadership within an interactional framework (Ghiselli, 1968; Winter, 
1973; Bass, 1985; McClelland, 1985; Hogan & Hogan, 1996; James, 1998; Bass, 2002; 
Hogan & Hogan, 2002; James & Mazerolle, 2002; Winter, 2002; James et al., 2005; 
Morris et al., 2005; Smith, 2011; and James et al., 2011, in press). A well-executed 
program of research investigating the implications of implicit personality for leadership 
in stressful dangerous situations would help accomplish four important objectives: 1) it 
would improve our understanding of the causes of effective leadership; 2) it could 
contribute to the definition and measurement of important leadership constructs such as 
leader ‘authenticity’; 3) it may help shift leadership research toward interactionism, 
facilitating leadership theories measuring fundamental leader, follower, and situational 
differences; and 4) it would contribute to leader selection and development practices for 
stressful and dangerous situations, as well as for more mundane work situations. 
The US Army Ranger School: A First Step 
The US Army Ranger School is an extremely intense combat leader development 
course. The purpose of the 61-day course is to develop leaders capable of motivating and 
directing others to achieve difficult and dangerous objectives while enduring the harsh 
psychological and physical demands of continuous combat operations. The Ranger 
course is unique in that it is the only leader development course in the US military 
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specifically designed to simulate the stresses of continuous combat operations as closely 
as possible: 
‘Leaders who make excellent tactical decisions in the classroom or in normal training 
sometimes fail miserably under the stress of combat. Hunger, fatigue, and the press of a 
tactical situation uncover weaknesses which an individual never knew he had. An 
individual in Ranger training gains an insight into himself and his fellow man. … it is a 
challenge to prove oneself in a realistic tactical environment, under mental and physical 
stress approaching that found in actual combat’ (Ranger, 1959; Ranger Handbook, 2000).  
 
While the Ranger course is not actual combat and does not intentionally risk lives, it does 
provide an opportunity to study leadership in a context where relatively dangerous 
individual and team tasks are performed7 and great efforts have been taken to simulate 
combat missions, conditions, environments and stressors (Ranger, 1959; Moore et al., 
1992; Bernton, Hoover, Galloway, & Popp, 1995; Friedl, Mays, Kramer, & Shippee, 
1995; Opstad, 1995; Walker, 1995; Ranger Handbook, 2000; Lock, 2005; Nindl et al., 
2007).  
The Ranger course is developmental, but also screens and selects combat leaders 
from among those selected to attend. Attrition rates fluctuate between 55% and 65%. To 
graduate, student leaders must learn and perform both as individuals and as a team, while 
enduring extreme sleep and food deprivation, and exposure to the elements combined 
with demanding cognitive and physical military tasks (Ranger, 1959; Moore et al., 1992; 
Bernton et al., 1995; Friedl et al., 1995; Opstad, 1995; Walker, 1995; Ranger Handbook, 
2000; Lock, 2005; Nindl et al., 2007). During the course, student behavior, performance, 
                                                 
 
 
7 For example: in 1977, two students died of hypothermia when they got separated from their squad in the 
wilderness; in 1985, one student drowned while crossing a swollen stream; in 1992, a student died of 
exposure during ‘mountain phase’ and another fell to his death while negotiating a high-altitude obstacle; in 
1995, four students died of hypothermia in a single incident; and other deaths and serious injuries have 
resulted from incidents ranging from lightning strikes to sky diving accidents (Lock, 2005). 
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and leadership are rigorously observed and the data recorded and evaluated by the 
school’s cadre of instructors. Importantly, instructors and commanders at the Ranger 
School were interested in the implications of implicit personality for leadership in 
stressful and dangerous situations, and agreed to support this study. 
Research Questions 
This study investigated the relationship between leader implicit personality as 
measured via conditional reasoning (specifically: the power motive, achievement motive, 
and aggression) and leader performance, peer evaluations, and attrition. The research 
questions included: 
1. Is implicit personality, as measured via conditional reasoning, predictive of leader 
performance, peer evaluations, and attrition in the US Army Ranger School? 
2. Will alternative analyses, e.g. ‘configural scoring’ (Meehl, 1950; Jannarone & 
Roberts, 1984), yield findings that would otherwise be misrepresented or hidden by 
linear correlations or regressions conducted on raw or standardized scores? 
Hypotheses 
Since the joint effects of these implicit motives had never been examined in this 
leadership domain before, a limited set of hypotheses was specified: 
1. Those scoring high on the Conditional Reasoning Test-Aggression8 (i.e. aggressive) 
combined with low scores on the Conditional Reasoning Test-Relative Motive 
Strength9 (i.e. fear-of-failure) were expected to do poorly relative to their peers on one 
or more of the three outcomes (leader performance, peer evaluations, and/or attrition). 
                                                 
 
 
8 CRT-A measures aggression vs. conflict avoidance. High scores signify aggression. 
9 CRT-RMS measures achievement motive vs. fear-of-failure. High scores signify achievement motives. 
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2. Those with high scores on the Conditional Reasoning Test-Leadership10 (i.e. power 
motivated) combined with high scores on CRT-RMS (i.e. achievement motivated) 
were expected to out-perform their peers on one or more of the three outcomes. 
3. Those with low scores on CRT-L (i.e. submissive) combined with low scores on CRT-
RMS (i.e. fear of failure) were expected to do poorly relative to their peers on one or 
more of the three outcomes. 
4. Alternative analyses (e.g. configural scoring) were expected to yield findings that 
would otherwise be misrepresented or hidden by linear correlations and regressions 
conducted on continuous scores. 
Although relationships involving other combinations of aggression and achievement 
motive (and more moderate scores on the power and achievement motives) were 
expected to vary in systematic and explainable ways, the specific interactions were not 
specified in a priori hypotheses. 
  
                                                 
 
 




This study employed a quantitative survey methodology. The data were collected without 
intrusive interference with Ranger students, and without impacting the normal operations 
of the Ranger School. On the night before they began their Ranger training, leaders who 
volunteered completed a one-hour, paper-and-pencil inductive reasoning test. Scores 
from that test were analyzed together with the data collected on each student as a normal 
part of Ranger School operations. 
Participants & Procedure 
 With approval from applicable IRBs and permission from military commanders, 
incoming students at the US Army Ranger School were asked to volunteer. Six hundred 
thirty two (out of more than 700 incoming students in two classes) signed informed 
consent forms, provided demographic information and answered a total of 48 inductive 
reasoning problems. Five participants were deleted from the data set: one participant 
skipped large portions of both his personality measures; and four participants showed 
strong evidence of response set (e.g. answering “c” to 12 questions in a row). 
Due to the nature of the course, the remaining 627 participants were all male, 
ranging in age from 19 to 43 (M=26, SD=3.9; see Table 1, Appendix B for 
demographics). Two hundred twelve (212) of the Rangers took both CRT-A and CRT-
RMS. Four hundred fifteen (415) of the Rangers took both CRT-L and CRT-RMS. After 





In the portion of the sample which took CRT-A and CRT-RMS (N=212), each 
leader’s aggression and achievement scores were obtained by scoring their answers on 
those two conditional reasoning tests (see: James, 1998; James & McIntyre, 2000; James 
et al., 2005; James et al., 2011, in press). In that part of the sample which took CRT-L 
and CRT-RMS (N=415), each leader’s power and achievement scores were obtained in 
the same manner. 
Criteria 
During Ranger School, classes are divided into small groups (‘squads’) containing 
between 12 and 15 soldiers. Individuals remain in squads for the duration of the training. 
Students train, learn and perform together in their assigned squad unless individual 
members quit, get injured, ‘get recycled’, or are otherwise removed from the course. 
When a student ‘gets recycled’, it means the student: 1) has failed that phase of the 
training, 2) is ejected from that class, but not from the Ranger School, and 3) must go 
back and repeat that phase of training with the subsequent class. To graduate, students 
must pass each of the three phases of Ranger training. These phases are called: 1) 
“Darby”, 2) “Mountain”, and 3) “Florida”. Due to the possibility of recycling, students do 
not necessarily graduate with the same class or squad they started with. During the 
course, training and evaluations are administered by Ranger Instructors (RIs) who 
rigorously monitor and evaluate student behavior, performance, and leadership. In 
addition, each leader is evaluated by his peers at the end of each training phase. 
Ultimately, students will either succeed and graduate, or fail and be attrited. Data 
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regarding these outcomes are available in the individual’s training records, kept by the 
Ranger School. Those records provide readily available and reliably measured criteria 
spanning: 1) attrition, 2) leader performance, and 3) peer evaluations. 
Attrition.  Students attrit from the Ranger School for one or more of roughly six 
reasons, they: 1) get injured, 2) quit, 3) get ‘peered out’, 4) lie, cheat, steal, or engage in 
other egregious conduct, 5) fail a required event during ‘Ranger Assessment’ and/or 6) 
are dismissed because they demonstrate poor leadership of mission patrols. Often, 
training records indicate that a leader was dismissed for more than one of these reasons. 
When one is attrited for injury or medical reasons, it is referred to as a “Med Drop”. To 
be “peered” means to have failed a peer evaluation. Those who quit are identified as 
“LOMs” (Lack of Motivation). Instances of cheating or other egregious conduct are 
identified as “SORs” (“Serious Observation Reports”). Given these data, relationships 
were assessed between student implicit personality and overall attrition (as in Wiita et al., 
2010, where achievement motive was shown to predict attrition in U.S. Navy SEALS 
BUD/S training), except here additional analyses also examine attrition by category. 
Leader Performance.  Available metrics of leader performance included: 1) 
whether or not student leaders were dismissed from the course because of poor leadership 
of mission patrols, and 2) the total number of training phases leaders passed, relative to 
the number failed.11 
                                                 
 
 
11 Note: Observing RIs have explicit guidelines and well-communicated norms for evaluating student 
leadership and performance. ‘Spot reports’ and ‘leadership position grades’ are compared across raters by 
senior instructors and Ranger School leaders. Consistency and agreement in these performance measures 
are important matters, which are actively monitored and maintained by Ranger School leaders. 
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Peer Evaluations. As a normal part of the Ranger School, student leaders are 
required to evaluate the other members of their squad at the end of each phase of training. 
During peer evaluations each student leader must force-rank every other member of his 
squad, except himself, from best to worst in a global measure of leadership and 
teamwork. The Ranger School provided a meticulous explanation of the peer evaluation 
scoring system (see Appendix A) but, briefly stated, if a leader fails a peer evaluation it 
means that approximately 2/3rds of the other members of his squad ranked him as being 
in the bottom 1/4 of the leaders they ranked. Further, none of his squad mates ranked that 
leader as being in the top 1/4. In other words, if one fails a peer evaluation it means there 
was strong agreement in the negative rankings provided by that leader’s peers. When a 
leader fails a peer evaluation, they are said to have been ‘peered-out’ of the squad. Often, 
that means they will be recycled and must repeat that phase of the training after being 
assigned to a new squad. But if that leader failed the phase for other reasons (in addition 
to his peer evaluation) or if he fails peer evaluations a second time (e.g. during his second 
attempt at the same phase), that leader is dropped from the course.  
Since there are three phases of the training, each leader might be expected to have 
three peer evaluations, but those who are recycled may experience more than three peer 
evaluations, and those who quit or are removed from the course may experience fewer.  For 
these reasons analyses of peer evaluations focused on: 1) whether or not leaders were 
dismissed from the course for peer evaluation failures, and 2) the total number of peer 





These data comprise a rich set, but the most important outcome is arguably 
whether or not leaders ultimately succeeded and graduated, or were dismissed. Since this 
criterion is binary and the raw scores provided by the predictors are continuous, these 
data were analyzed in logistic regressions to see if the measures of implicit personality 
predicted graduation from Ranger School. In the first part of the sample (N=212), the 
predictors were the raw scores on CRT-A and CRT-RMS. In the second part of the 
sample (N=415), the predictors were the raw scores on CRT-L and CRT-RMS. 
In alternative analyses, implicit personality scores were assessed in the context of 
cutoff scores and a configural scoring paradigm as being either: a) leaders likely to 
succeed (LLS), b) leaders likely to fail (LLF); or c) leaders likely to perform at the mean 
(LLM). Since that assessment converted two separate, continuous personality scores to a 
single, three-level ordinal predictor, chi-square analyses were employed to see if implicit 
personality, evaluated in this manner, predicted the criteria. The results of the regressions 
and configural scoring analyses were compared to see if configural scoring yielded findings 













RESULTS & DISCUSSION (CRT-A & RMS, N=212) 
In the part of the sample that took CRT-A and CRT-RMS, raw scores on CRT-A ranged 
from 0 to +12 (M = 5.3, SD = 2.4). Raw scores on CRT-RMS ranged from -7 to +15 (M = 
7.6, SD = 4.3). Readers will note that participants in both parts of the sample took CRT-
RMS. In the sample as a whole (i.e. N=627), raw scores on CRT-RMS ranged from -8 to 
+16 (M = 7.1, SD = 4.6). See histograms at Appendix B.  Interestingly, scores on the 
measure of aggression (i.e. CRT-A) were significantly correlated with those on the 
measure of achievement motivation (i.e. CRT-RMS), r(210) = -0.184, p = .007. 
A logistic regression of graduation on CRT-A, RMS, and the interaction term 
yielded a model which was not significantly better than the ‘intercept only’ model, χ2 (3, 
N=212) = 5.615, p = .132. Table 2 (Appendix B) shows the logistic regression 
coefficients, Wald tests, and odds ratios for each of the predictors. Briefly stated, none of 
the terms were significant. For example, for every one point increase in Aggression, 
leaders were somewhere between .864 and 1.32 times more likely to graduate. If the 
value is .864, it would mean one’s probability of graduation would decrease with every 
one-point increase in aggression. If the value is 1.32, it would mean the probability of 
graduation increases with every one-point increase in aggression. In short, this analysis 
depicts the effect of a one-point increase in aggression as not reliably positive or negative 
(i.e. as not distinguishable from zero).  
The findings were similar regarding the measure of achievement motive, and for 
the interaction term between aggression and achievement. Further, when logistic 
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regressions were employed to investigate leader-performance and peer-evaluation 
criteria, the results were no better. Most analyses stop at this point, often concluding that 
individual differences either have nothing to do with effective leadership, or that the 
relationships are not particularly compelling. But I believe they are missing something. 
Leadership science seems to examine individual differences either in an ‘atomistic’ 
fashion, or through lenses that depend on adding scores together in linear combinations 
and correlating those linear combinations with measures (or linear combinations of 
measures) of leader and organizational performance. But what if these differences just 
don’t combine that way? 
Poker & the Odds of Leader Success 
What if, instead, individual differences combine in a manner similar to the way 
the values and suits of playing cards operate together to determine the rank of a given 
poker hand? In poker, it is the rank of the hand that provides us with an indication of its 
odds of success, rather than the values of the individual cards themselves, or some linear 
combination of those values. Domains, situations, and groups of followers vary. But so 
do the rules of 5- vs. 7-card stud and Texas Hold'em. The point here is not that the one 
leadership domain is different from another. That’s true, but more interesting is the fact 
that our ability to understand every variation of poker is built upon our knowledge of a 
single underlying system of ordinal measurement that remains largely intact across 
specific variations of the game.  
Imagine a deck of playing cards. But instead of the deck being limited to 4 suits, 
imagine that it has many. Of those different suits, perhaps only 5 are valuable or relevant 
in a given variation of poker. Maybe 8 suits are in play in some other variation. We do 
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not yet know the exact number of suits that are in play in any specific variation of poker, 
but the number of suits that are relevant in any variation is limited, and certain suits are 
always valuable in poker, no matter which variation is being played at the moment. 
To clarify this analogy further, a 'suit' is an individual difference variable. The 
value on a card of a given suit is akin to one's score on that individual difference variable. 
While scores on individual variables may be framed from low to high, they are assessed 
in combination, and in the context of the game being played, as either ‘likely to win’ or 
‘not likely to win’. So, to restate what I said above, I suspect that the number of 
individual difference variables needed to assess the odds of success for a given leader in a 
given domain is limited, and certain variables are always predictive no matter what 
leadership domain we are selecting for. 
Poker & the Measurement of Individual Differences  
In a normal deck of cards, there are 13 cards in every suit. These are analogous to 
an ordinal measurement system - one where errors in comparing the value of one poker 
hand to another are rare. When errors in comparing hands do occur, it is primarily 
because one or more people either don't know how to read the cards, or pay insufficient 
attention to them. 
In psychology, I’d argue that the current state of measurement also provides us 
with measurements that are basically ordinal. But most of these systems: a) lack the 
stratification, and b) are not nearly as discrete as those found on a poker table. While 
measurement issues make it more difficult to reliably detect who has a set of individual 
differences which is likely to succeed (versus who is holding a hand likely to lose), 
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measurement issues alone are not the reason psychology has yet to provide a way to 
assess the likelihood of leader success. Instead, I suspect we are not paying sufficient 
attention to the cards, and we have yet to deduce how to read them. That is, we lack an 
understanding of how the cards in a would-be leader's hand combine to provide us with 
an indication of the odds that leader will be effective in his or her chosen domain. 
To explain: in psychology, we might choose an individual difference variable we 
have reason to believe is important to leader effectiveness in a given domain. Then we 
design instruments to detect if the value of the card they hold of that suit is at a level we'd 
consider high or low. Many current measures are even good enough to detect if the value 
is 'a middle card'. A complicating issue is that the three levels above are necessarily 
'fuzzy'. This is because psychologists are much less sure about how to categorize the 
value of a card which is close to a cutoff value. Meaning, in our science, if an individual's 
true score is 10 (e.g. on a variable like 'implicit achievement motive') it may be measured 
on a psychological test as an 8 (or vice-versa). So, if the cutoff score delineating the level 
of achievement motivation which is an asset in a leader is 10, then we are not particularly 
confident in classifying one with a raw score of 10 as ‘advantaged’ on that variable. We 
would be much more confident about doing so if his score on the test were a 16 (for 
example). In contrast, on a poker table, a deuce of spades is always the deuce of spades 
and a five of hearts is always the five of hearts. Yet, in spite of such concerns, I suspect 
we must still evaluate the suits and card values in an individual's hand in order to make a 




Not All Variables Are Equally Important 
On a poker table, suits have rank. These ranks are clear, ordinal, discrete, and 
invariant across poker games: 1) spades - the highest, 2) hearts, 3) diamonds, and 4) clubs 
- the lowest. In predicting leader effectiveness, we have yet to fully grasp the ranking 
system which applies to predictor variables, but we have some ideas about it.  
Here again, the ordinal measurement system we can achieve both lacks 
stratification, and is not nearly as discrete as what we find on a poker table. Given the 
state of our knowledge, we cannot rank each individual difference variable in its own 
ordinal level of importance with regard to predicting the odds of leader success in a given 
domain. We can only posit that some individual differences are: a) more important, b) 
less important, or c) largely irrelevant in most cases and situations. Again, these 
classifications are necessarily 'fuzzy' in the context of domain/follower differences. That 
said, I believe theoretical and empirical work supports the following suits as among those 
we should consider 'more important' in most leadership domains: implicit power; implicit 
achievement; cognitive abilities; and domain specific knowledge/skills. I suspect the 
following variables to be among those 'less important': implicit aggression; narcissism; 
leadership behaviors or styles (e.g. 'transformational'), measures of explicit personality, 
and ‘the quality of leader-follower relationships’. Finally, I'd nominate any of the 
multitude of perceptual measures, self-report motives/values, prescriptive theories, and 
recommended philosophies that make up the remainder of the leadership literature as 
'largely irrelevant’. 
Briefly explained: variables akin to abilities, implicit motives and domain specific 
knowledge reside in the 'more important’ category because: a) these develop in context 
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over a lifetime and a career, i.e. they are difficult or time-consuming to change; and b) 
they are likely to be more important drivers of behavior in stressful and dangerous 
situations (Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Smith, 2011). On the other hand, variables like 
implicit aggression seem ‘less important’ because their consequences seem to be 
contingent upon the values of more important variables. Finally, behavioral styles are less 
important because in stressful or dangerous situations the ability to adhere to a 
consciously learned behavioral style depends on cognitive capacity, rationality, and 
volition (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). In addition, the ‘more important’ variables 
speak to the question: “does this person have the basic drives, abilities, and knowledge 
required to lead in this domain?” If the answer to that question is yes, then those with 
advantageous behavioral styles might do better than those employing disadvantageous 
behavioral styles. But if the answer to that question is no, then there is no ‘frequency of 
transformational leader behaviors’ that will compensate. 
Ranking Poker Hands 
Importantly, the cards of a poker hand are most meaningful when they are all 
viewed together and judged in the context of the specific variation of poker being played. 
This is not to say that they can be added together or multiplied in linear 
combinations. Players with a pair of sixes are not assigned a score of 12, 36, or 
48. Significant liabilities can exist, and yet be meaningless in the context of a poker hand 
that also contains important and timely assets. Under some conditions, certain liabilities 
may render certain assets unimportant but, again, this is not because liabilities are always 
subtracted from assets, and not because negatives (liabilities) always interact with (are 
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multiplied by) positives (assets) to create an even larger negative. Poker hands just don’t 
work that way. 
It is more appropriate to say that the suits and card values channel each other 
contingent upon the suits and values of all the other cards in the hand. Any given card can 
have a qualitatively different meaning when viewed in the context of one hand vs. 
another. In some experiments this could look like an interaction but it may not be (at least 
not in a strict, multiplicative interpretation of that word).  Instead, the rank of a poker 
hand is determined by conditional rules of logic. This rank, in turn, is related to the odds 
of that hand's success. This analogy considered, it is possible that linear combinations of 
individual difference variables are not adequate to describe the way individual 
differences combine. The relevant individual differences in the profile of a leader could 
combine, instead, as the values and suits of playing cards do.  
Poker and the Odds of Marital Success 
There is reason to believe this approach to assessing the odds of leader success 
would work. In fact, similar prediction systems have been shown to be valid in other 
fields of psychology. Larson and colleagues (1994; 1994; 2000) study marriage and 
family issues, specializing in premarital counseling (e.g. “should you two get married or 
not?”). They built a system for assessing the odds that a would-be marriage will end in 
divorce. It is based primarily on individual differences, and the system has 3 aspects. 
First, a limited set of about 7 individual difference variables are assessed in both partners. 
In the context of cutoff scores, these variables are evaluated as either assets or liabilities. 
Second, a limited set of about 7 ‘couple traits’ are assessed in the same way. The ‘couple 
traits’ are the result of intra-couple individual differences. For example, if both partners 
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are of similar levels of intelligence it is labeled an asset. If one is high in intelligence and 
the other low, it is a liability. In another example ‘communication skills’ are assessed. 
Observations of the couple’s interactions are made while they discuss one or more 
substantive pre-marital questions. If both partners are assessed as having good 
communication skills, then the value of this variable is judged to be an ‘asset’. If one is 
assessed as having bad communication skills the impact on the odds of success is not 
clear. If both are assessed as having bad communication skills this variable is assessed as 
a liability. Finally, a limited set of about 6 situational differences are assessed as being 
either supportive of success, obstacles to success, or 'impact not clear'. These variables 
are not combined linearly. They are assessed as one assesses the cards in a poker hand, 
i.e. configural scoring (Meehl, 1950; Jannarone & Roberts, 1984). The Larson et al. 
system can’t and does not attempt to predict the outcome of specific cases. But it does 
provide very useful information, e.g. ‘couples matching your profile who marry have 
odds of divorce nearly 3 times worse than the national average.’ This information, 
combined with advice and, where possible, development is the core of a system with 
demonstrated and compelling validities when it comes to assessing and improving the 
odds of marital success (Holman et al., 1994; Larson & Holman, 1994; Larson, 2000). I 
believe leadership scientists can use common sense and empirical data to build a system 
like this that will work better than anything currently available when it comes to 
assessing the odds of small and mid-level leader success vs. failure. 
Poker and the Assessment of Leader Personalities with CRT-A & RMS  
In the first part of the sample, I wish to use the available measures to quantify the 
personalities of 212 leaders in an ordinal metric of implicit personality vis-à-vis 
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leadership in this domain. I have measures of implicit aggression and achievement 
motive, but what do specific combinations of these scores mean in the context of this 
leadership domain? While we have yet to investigate this issue, we can apply our 
knowledge of these individual differences and the domain to propose and test a set of 
cutoff scores and channeling rules that are reasonable. 
For example, we have reason to believe personalities driven by implicit 
achievement are more likely to succeed in this leadership domain. This in mind, we 
consult the distribution of scores on CRT-RMS and set a cutoff score based on plus or 
minus one standard deviation. If CRT-RMS is greater than or equal to 10, we classify that 
individual as driven by achievement and refer to him as an “AM”. If the score is less than 
or equal to 4, we classify that individual as driven by fear of failure and refer to him as an 
“FF”. If the score is between 4 and 10, we consider that individual to be ‘in the middle’ 
and refer to him neither an AM nor an FF (nAM). In this leadership domain, implicit 
achievement, as measured by CRT-RMS, is posited as a ‘more important’ variable. 
With achievement, we were inclined to evaluate high scores as personality assets 
and low scores as liabilities. But with aggression, our knowledge of the domain and of 
the construct as measured by CRT-A causes us to posit a different relationship. Empirical 
evidence has shown that personalities scoring 8 or higher on CRT-A are apt to engage in 
counterproductive work behaviors (James & LeBreton, 2012, p. 118), so we have reason 
to believe that, all things being equal, an overly aggressive personality is not an asset. 
But, in this domain, a conflict avoidant individual is also not an asset. In layman’s terms: 
we might expect the leaders with the highest odds of success in this domain to be those 
who are ‘not looking for a fight’ but ‘would not run’ if one were made necessary. This in 
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mind, we set a cutoff score: if CRT-A is greater than or equal to 8, we classify that 
individual as driven by Aggression and refer to him as an “AG”. If CRT-A is lesser than 
or equal to 4, we classify that individual as a ‘Conflict Avoidant Pro-social’ and refer to 
him as a “CAP”. If the score is between 5 and 7, we classify that individual as being in 
the middle and refer to him as neither an AG nor as a CAP (i.e. nAG). In this leadership 
domain, aggression is posited as a ‘less important’ variable.  
With reasonable cutoff scores set, we must now consider the channeling rules that 
describe how the aspects of a multifaceted person combine to predict the odds of leader 
success in this domain. The best place to start would be to consider all those variables 
posited as ‘more important’. Unfortunately, in the current study we lack measures of 
abilities and domain specific knowledge, but the available measures of implicit 
personality are still sufficient to establish a tertiary stratification of the sample. 
A two-way ANOVA was carried out to gain an understanding of the initial 
performance data for each of the nine personalities conceptualized by the factorial 
combination of the three levels of aggression and the three levels of achievement 
motivation. While the ANOVA indicates that neither grouping factor, nor the interaction 
are significant predictors of graduation, researchers with knowledge of these individual 
differences and the domain see differences in performance across personality types that 
are both compelling and explainable (see Figure 3 and Tables 3 & 4, at Appendix B). In 
the following pages, leader personality types are judged based on the likely personality 
dynamics and initial performance data. They are classified either as: 1) leaders likely to 
succeed (LLS); 2) leaders likely to fail (LLF); or 3) leaders likely to perform near the 
mean (LLM).  
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As we shall see, when leader personalities are evaluated in this way there are 
compelling differences in their performance and leadership. While the personality 
dynamics I posit to explain these differences must be substantiated by future data sets, I 
judge them to be reasonable and likely enough to warrant continued research in this and 
in other domains and contexts; and to warrant research considering leadership and 
effectiveness outcomes other than those examined in this study. 
Leaders Likely to Succeed (LLSs – as scored by CRT-A & RMS)  
While assessing personalities in this part of the sample, it is important to note that we are 
dealing with two personality variables that are posited as being of unequal importance 
(i.e. aggression is posited as less important than implicit achievement).  
First, consider “aggressive AMs” (AG-AM). AG-AMs graduated at a rate of 54% 
in a sample where the graduation rate was 40% (see Table 3, p. 70). AG is a strong 
approach motive with consequences which are often negative or antisocial. AM is 
another strong approach motive with consequences which are often positive (Allport, 
1937; McClelland, 1985; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James & LeBreton, 2012). When 
coexistent in the same individual in the context of Ranger School, we find a strong 
approach motive in congruence another strong approach motive; and we find negative 
consequences dominated by positive consequences. When AMs, in the context of their 
chosen domain, encounter a situation requiring they achieve important and difficult 
objectives, they experience arousal, attraction and an implicit desire to approach (i.e. 
engage) until they have achieved. When AGs encounter a situation or other entity which 
can be framed as a struggle, fight or conflict, they experience arousal, attraction and an 
implicit desire to approach/engage in that fight until they have vanquished the foe and/or 
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inflicted considerable harm (Allport, 1937; McClelland, 1985; James & Mazerolle, 2002; 
James & LeBreton, 2012). In Ranger School, the AG-AM has been furnished with both 
an opportunity to achieve and an entity to attack. Briefly stated, the AG-AM is not a 
personality likely to ‘let Ranger school get the best of him’ - at least not without a fight. 
Importantly, and fortunately for AG-AMs, the positive consequences of their strong 
achievement motive seem to arrest the normally antisocial consequences of their 
aggression. I suspect, in the context of Ranger School, their strong drive to achieve 
enables them to embrace a tight-knit in-group (i.e. the squad, their ‘Ranger buddies’) and 
channel their aggressive, as well as their achievement oriented energies, toward 
accomplishing the difficult objectives which will enable them to prevail in what many 
approach as an epic struggle. 
Next, consider “non-aggressive AMs” (nAG-AM).  Leaders of this personality 
type graduated at a rate of 51% in a sample where the graduation rate was 40%. This set 
of personalities does not have a strong approach motive concerning fights and conflicts 
but they are not conflict avoidant. While nAGs may not be ‘looking for a fight’, they are 
not likely to run from one made necessary. In Ranger school, nAG-AMs find themselves 
in a situation which may easily be approached as ‘a fight made necessary’. Given the 
similarities between those scored as nAG-AM and those scored as AG-AMs its likely 
similar personality dynamics are in play. This, in combination with their initial 
performance data, causes me to classify these personalities in a larger group called 
‘leaders likely to succeed’ (LLSs). That is, in the particular poker being played, we can 
only see two cards of any given leader’s hand. If one of those cards is an AG (or nAG) 
and the other is an AM, then we are peering over the shoulder of a leader we should bet 
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on. As we shall see, relative to the other leader personality types we might select, these 
two are more likely to win. 
Leaders Likely to Fail (LLFs – as scored by CRT-A & RMS)  
Of those likely to fail, first consider the aggressive FF (AG-FF; graduation rate: 
25%).  Recall that AG is a strong approach motive with generally antisocial 
consequences. FF is a strong avoidance motive with generally negative consequences 
(Allport, 1937; McClelland, 1985; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James & LeBreton, 2012). 
When coexistent in the same individual in the context of Ranger School, we find a strong 
approach motive in conflict with a more important avoidance motive; and antisocial 
consequences compounded by additional negative consequences. FFs, placed in a 
situation requiring they achieve important and difficult objectives, experience anxiety and 
an implicit aversion to that situation. Unfortunately, the most likely result of that anxiety 
(i.e. fear) is that it fuels their aggression (Moyer, 1968). Ultimately, aggressive FFs 
struggle with an implicit desire to avoid any situation putting them at risk of failure (e.g. 
Ranger School), while simultaneously being hampered by an antisocial personality ill-
equipped to successfully reach out for, or receive social support. When driven by fear-of-
failure, aggression is not easily released in ways which are productive or protective of in-
group cohesion. These probable dynamics, in combination with the initial performance 
data, cause me to classify AG-FFs as “leaders likely to fail” (LLFs). 
Next consider the “conflict avoidant pro-social non-AM” (CAP-nAM; graduation 
rate: 23%). CAPs are not emotionally or cognitively prepared to rationalize or justify a 
long or intense struggle against some enemy entity. When CAPs encounter a situation, 
person, or an entity which might lead to or be framed as a fight or conflict, they are likely 
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to avoid framing the situation in that manner. Briefly stated, CAPs are peaceful people. 
They seek ways to avoid fights/conflicts and framing things as fights and conflicts 
because situations requiring they engage in a fight or conflict cause anxiety, aversion, and 
an implicit desire to disengage from and avoid that situation or entity. While nAMs are 
not FFs, they do lack the strong achievement motive found in AMs (James & Mazerolle, 
2002; James et al., 2005; James et al., 2011, in press). In the context of Ranger School, 
CAP-nAMs are not likely to be dominated by an implicit fear of failure (as FFs would 
be), nor are they likely to be driven to engage, persevere and overcome (as AMs would 
be). In fact, since we can only judge by the measures available, it appears the CAP-
nAM’s only strong implicit motive is to avoid conflict (e.g. ‘to live and let live’). If 
driven by an additional strong implicit motive, CAP dispositions may prove very 
valuable. But judging by the initial performance data, it appears that leader personalities 
which might be described as ‘live and let live’ are not particularly well suited to lead in 
places where leadership means influencing a group of cold, hungry, exhausted people to 
accomplish difficult military objectives, under harsh and demanding circumstances. 
While qualitative personality dynamics like those described above must be substantiated 
by further research, I believe these to be reasonable. For these reasons, CAP-nAGs join 
AG-FFs to complete the larger group of personalities labeled LLF. 
Leaders Likely to Perform at the Mean (LLMs – as scored by CRT-A & RMS)  
Next, consider the “conflict avoidant pro-social AM” (CAP-AM; graduation rate: 
41%). Recall that, in the context of Ranger School, the AG-AM’s affinity for conflict 
seems to have been an asset, but when driven by strong achievement motive the CAP’s 
aversion for conflict is not necessarily a liability. Ranger School (unlike direct fire 
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combat) is ambiguous enough that it can be framed entirely as an opportunity to achieve. 
Therefore, the CAP-AMs strong approach motive for achievement is not necessarily 
attenuated by his aversion to fighting (it is merely not enhanced). Further, Ranger School 
is so team oriented that coexisting CAP and AM motives likely make these personalities 
valuable as an intra-squad caretakers and peacekeepers. CAP-AMs likely step forward to 
assist others and to cushion, mitigate and reframe intra-team conflicts between more 
aggressive individuals. In short, it is possible and likely that a squad full of AG-AMs 
would not be so successful unless there were also CAP-AMs in the squad. Further, if the 
situation were direct fire combat, a CAP-AM’s strong aversion for fighting and conflict 
could very well be dominated by his strong pro-social affinity for those around him, 
combined with his drive to achieve. To rephrase this dynamic in terms common among 
soldiers, he may fight in spite of his aversion to it ‘because he could not bear to fail his 
comrades’. While symbiotic relationships between certain personality types (and 
behavioral reactions in combat or other situations) must be substantiated by research, 
these personality dynamics are reasonably likely. This, in combination with initial 
performance data indicating the CAP-AM success rate was not strikingly different from 
the mean, causes me to place them within the larger group: ‘leaders likely to perform near 
the mean’ (LLM). Although CAP-AMs are not necessarily more likely than their peers to 
succeed in Ranger School, this is not necessarily an indication that this set of dispositions 
should be undervalued. 
Now, consider two personalities which are different but engender similar 
personality dynamics: the “non-aggressive FF” (nAG-FF), and the “conflict avoidant pro-
social FF” (CAP-FF). When placed in a situation requiring they achieve important and 
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difficult objectives, both these personality types are likely to experience the anxiety and 
implicit aversion which is a characteristic of FFs. But lacking a strong motive to aggress, 
the nAG-FF is not as ill-equipped (as the AG-FF was) when it comes to reaching out for, 
and receiving social support. The CAP-FF, on the other hand, is quite well equipped to 
seek and obtain social support. More important than that, is the likelihood that their 
implicit fear-of-failure drives them to seek social support and makes them dependent 
upon it. To explain, people experiencing fear/anxiety seek social support (Taylor et al., 
2000; Mawson, 2005; Smith, 2011, pp. 56-57; Radford, in press), and in a team oriented 
domain such as Ranger school, those equipped to obtain it are better able to manage (and 
more likely to overcome) their fear of failure.  
I suspect it was dynamics like these which enabled both nAG-FFs and CAP-FFs 
to perform near the mean. However, readers with knowledge of military settings might be 
quick to point out that in operational environments (e.g. combat) leaders wear rank. In 
Ranger School, rank is not recognized among squad members - only position, and the 
leadership positions rotate among the members of the squad. The existence of rank in 
operational environments means that leaders in those settings inhabit organizational 
structures which are more hierarchical and social support is not so easy to attain. Briefly 
stated, leading in combat can be lonely. So leader personalities requiring constant 
psychological support from subordinates, superiors and peers are less likely to be 
effective. Also, in operational settings a strong fear-of-failure, aversion-for-conflict (or 
the combination of both) may impact a would-be leader’s ability to ‘speak truth to 
power’.  More importantly, these may impact one’s ability to discipline (and when 
necessary, control) certain types of subordinate personalities (e.g. AGs).  While 
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personality dynamics like these must be explored by further research, I believe these to 
be reasonably likely. These concerns, in combination with the initial performance data, 
lead me to classify nAG-FFs and CAP-FFs within the larger group known as LLMs. 
Next, consider the aggressive non-AM (AG-nAM; graduation rate: 45%). Since 
we can only judge by the available measures, it appears that the AG-nAM’s only strong 
implicit motive is aggression. In many situations, this is likely to be a disadvantageous 
motivational profile, but in Ranger School it appears AG-nAMs benefited to a degree 
from the fact that they are not FFs, and they possess at least one strong, personality-
defining approach motive. Unfortunately, in these personalities, it is likely that the 
antisocial consequences of aggression are not as well arrested by achievement (as we 
suspect they are in AG-AMs). This is especially concerning because findings indicate 
that the possession of power ‘amplifies’ the expression of other motives, traits and 
attributes (Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008, pp. 173-174). AG-nAMs may have 
a disposition which allows them a reasonable probability of success in early leadership 
positions. But as they ascend to positions of real power, their increasingly unchecked 
aggression could lead to their derailment (Lombardo, Ruderman, & McCauley, 1988; 
Chidester et al., 1991; Kellerman, 2004). These concerns combined with their initial 
performance data lead me to classify them as LLMs. 
Finally, consider non-aggressive non-AMs (nAG-nAM; graduation rate: 44%). In 
these personalities the available measures have identified no strong implicit motives. 
These people are not especially aggressive or conflict avoidant; nor are they especially 
driven by achievement or fear of failure. In these cases, given the measures available, it is 
difficult to postulate a set of personality dynamics pointing to an increased (or decreased) 
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likelihood of success or failure, relative to the mean of their similarly situated peers. This, 
combined with the initial performance data, causes me to classify them as LLMs. 
Trends & Findings Based on Configural Scoring of Leader Personalities (N=212) 
  Analyzing the data in light of the configural scoring paradigm described above, 
readers will notice certain trends. For example, no level of aggression combines with 
fear-of-failure to raise the rank of FF personalities higher than LLM. Similarly, no level 
of aggression combines with a strong achievement motive to lower the rank of AM 
personalities lower than LLM. Also, leaders labeled ‘likely to succeed’ (LLS) are two 
personalities and comprise 25.5% of the sample (see Table 3, p. 70). Those labeled 
‘likely to fail’ (LLF) are also two personalities, and comprise 24% of the sample. The 
subset labeled ‘likely to perform at the mean’ (LLM) contains five personalities, 
constituting the remaining 50.5% of the sample. These descriptive statistics make sense 
in that we might expect only a subset of personalities to be better equipped to lead in this 
domain. Similarly, we might expect a subset of similar size to have personality flaws 
inhibiting their leadership. Finally, we might expect a sizable subset to have personalities 
which are largely benign relative to those of their higher and lower-performing peers. 
Attrition 
Turning our attention to evaluating differences in attrition across these groups, chi 
square analyses indicate that the odds an LLS would graduate were more than 3.5 times 
those of an LLF, χ2 (2, N=212) = 9.016, p = .011 (see Table 5, p. 70). Further, the odds an 
LLS would be dismissed from the course for poor leadership of missions were zero. That 
is, not one LLS was dismissed from the course for this reason. But LLMs were relieved 
from the course for poor mission leadership at a rate of 5.6%, and LLFs were relieved at 
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a rate of 11.8%. That is, the odds of an LLF being removed from the course for poor 
mission leadership were 2.3 times that of an LLM, χ2 (2, N=212) = 6.79, p = .033 (see 
Table 6, p. 71). This finding becomes even more compelling when we account for the 
fact that many were attrited from the course before they ever had a chance to lead a 
patrol. If we repeat this analysis considering only the 112 leaders who survived long 
enough to lead a patrol, we see that LLMs were relieved from the course for poor mission 
leadership at a rate of 10.9%, and LLFs were relieved at a rate of 25%. That is, the odds 
of an LLF being removed from the course for poor mission leadership were 2.73 times 
that of an LLM, χ2 (2, N=112) = 9.08, p = .011 (see Table 6b, p. 71). 
Similar findings revealed the odds that an LLS would quit the course were zero 
(i.e. not one LLS quit), where the odds of an LLF quitting were seven times that of an 
LLM, χ2 (2, N=212) = 5.96, p = .051 (see Table 7, P. 71). Additionally, not one LLS was 
relieved from the course for cheating or other egregious conduct. But LLMs were 
relieved for this reason at a rate of 2.8%, and LLFs at a rate of 9.8%. The odds of an LLF 
being relieved for egregious conduct were 3.75 times that of an LLM, χ2 (2, N=212) = 
7.5, p = .023 (see Table 8, p. 72).  
Finally, since the Ranger School commander often cites multiple reasons for 
dismissing a leader from the course, I summed the number of reasons cited for each 
leader to create a ratio scale dependent variable. I analyzed each leader’s ‘number of 
reasons cited for dismissal’ in an ANOVA to assess group differences. On average, LLFs 
and LLMs were dismissed for a significantly higher number of reasons than LLSs, F(2, 
212) = 5.348, p = .005 (see tables 9 and 10, p. 72). Planned repeated contrasts revealed 
that, while LLFs did not significantly differ from LLMs (95% CI for the difference [-
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.051, .374], p = .135), on average both LLFs and LLMs were dismissed for a significantly 
higher number of reasons than LLSs were (95% CI for the difference between LLMs and 
LLSs [.029, .446], p = .025). 
But leader personality did not predict differences in every kind of attrition. Chi-
square analyses indicated no difference across groups in the odds of: 1) being ‘peered’ 
out of the course, χ2 (2, N=212) = 1.18, p = .55412; 2) failing a required event during 
‘Ranger Assessment’ (e.g. the 5-mile run, or night orienteering test), χ2 (2, N=212) = 
2.255, p = .324, and 3) being removed from the course for medical reasons, χ2 (2, N=212) 
= .807, p = .668. See Tables 11-13, pp. 72 and 73. 
Leader Performance 
Regarding leader performance, we’ve already seen in the attrition analyses that 
the odds a leader would be dismissed from the course for poor mission leadership 
depended upon his personality (see p. 38-39). But the odds a leader would pass a given 
phase of the training also depended on his personality. That is, the odds an LLS would 
pass a given phase of the training were 2.25 times better than those of an LLF, χ2 (2, 
N=468) = 8.92, p = .012 (see Table 14, p. 73).    
Peer Evaluations 
 With respect to peer evaluations, the attrition analyses already indicated that the 
odds of being ‘peered out’ of the course were not significantly related to leader implicit 
                                                 
 
 
12 Note: If we repeat this analysis considering only the 112 leaders who survived long enough to face a peer 
evaluation, the difference is still statistically insignificant, χ2 (2, N=112) = 1.28, p = .529. 
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personality (see p. 40). But interestingly, the odds a leader would pass a given peer 
evaluation did depend on his personality (i.e. the odds an LLS would pass a given peer 
evaluation were 4.15 times better than those of an LLF, χ2 (2, N=356) = 6.42, p = .04; see 
Table 15, p. 74). The fact that LLFs were more likely to fail any given peer evaluation 
but were not more likely to be removed from the course for that reason, reflects that the 
decision to remove a leader from the course is administrative, involving other factors. For 
example, if a leader fails his peer evaluation but receives a passing grade on at least one 
of the patrols he led in that phase, he is likely to be recycled rather than removed. Peer 
evaluation failures normally only result in removal when they are repeated, or if a single 
peer evaluation failure is combined with poor leadership of patrols. 
Summary of Findings (CRT-A & CRT-RMS, N=212)  
The analyses conducted on this part of the sample indicate that: a) implicit 
personality is predictive of leader performance, peer evaluations, and attrition in the US 
Army Ranger School; and b) the alternative analysis (i.e. configural scoring) yielded 
findings that were misrepresented or hidden by the linear and interactive logistic regressions 
conducted on the continuous personality scores.  
Further, when we assess the impact over time (i.e. from the beginning of the course to 
the end) the relationships between implicit personality and the odds of leader success in 
Ranger School are apparent. An inspection of Figure 4 (on p. 74) reveals that, regardless of 
personality, the first three days of Ranger School are unforgiving. These first days (known as 
“Ranger Assessment”) attrited approximately 40% of the LLSs, and over 60% of the LLFs. 
But for the implicit personalities labeled ‘likely to succeed’ attrition after that point was 
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minimal.  In contrast, the ranks of those labeled ‘likely to fail’ continue to dwindle 
throughout the course.   
In the end, the personality composition of the group of leaders who graduated was 
significantly altered relative to the group which began the course.  On “Day 0”, LLSs were 
roughly equal in number to the LLFs, and LLMs made up the other half of the class.  But, of 
those still standing on graduation day, we find that LLMs still accounted for roughly half the 
graduates, while the portion of LLSs grew substantially, and the portion of LLFs was 







RESULTS & DISCUSSION (CRT-L & RMS, N=415) 
In the part of the sample that took CRT-L and CRT-RMS, raw scores on CRT-L ranged 
from -5 to +6 (M = 0.22, SD = 1.97; see histogram at Appendix C). Raw scores on CRT-
RMS ranged from -8 to +16 (M = 6.9, SD=4.7; recall that the histogram for CRT-RMS is 
at Appendix B). Interestingly, scores on the measure of the power motive (i.e. CRT-L) 
were significantly correlated with scores on the measure of achievement motive (i.e. 
CRT-RMS), r(413) = -0.132, p = .007. 
A logistic regression of graduation on CRT-L, RMS, and the interaction term 
yielded a model which was significantly better than the ‘intercept only’ model, χ2 (3, 
N=415) = 9.07, p = .028. Table 16 (on p. 77) shows the logistic regression coefficients, 
Wald tests, and odds ratios for each of the predictors. With the larger sample size (i.e. 
N=415), the effect of individual differences in achievement motive is statistically 
significant. That is, for every one point increase in achievement motive, leaders were 
approximately 1.07 times more likely to graduate. So, if one’s odds of graduation were 
1.0 (i.e. “50-50”), then the odds for someone else, whose achievement motive is 
approximately one standard deviation higher (e.g. 4 points), would be 1.3 (or 56.5%). But 
the regression analysis finds the impact of the power motive, and its interaction with 
achievement motive, to be statistically insignificant. Again, at this point most studies 
would stop, likely concluding that the impact of differences in implicit personality is not 
particularly compelling. But what happens if we assess the scores on CRT-L and RMS as 
one would assess a poker hand? As it turns out, the findings are quite different. 
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Poker and the Assessment of Leader Personalities with CRT-L & RMS  
In this part of the sample, I wish to use the available measures to quantify the 
personalities of the 415 Ranger students who took CRT-L and CRT-RMS. As before, we 
can apply our knowledge of the individual differences and the domain to propose and test 
a set of reasonable cutoff scores and channeling rules. For example, we have reason to 
believe personalities driven by an implicit power are more likely to succeed in this 
leadership domain. This in mind, we consult the distribution of scores on CRT-L and set 
a cutoff score. If CRT-L is greater than or equal to 4, we classify that individual as driven 
by power and refer to him as a “PO”.  If CRT-L is less than or equal to -1, we classify 
that individual as submissive and refer to him as an “SU”. If the score on CRT-L is 
between 0 and 3, we consider that individual to be in the middle and refer to him as 
neither a PO nor an SU (i.e. “nPO”).  In this leadership domain, implicit power as 
measured by CRT-L, is posited as a ‘more important’ variable. The cutoff scores for 
CRT-RMS are already set (see p. 29). 
With reasonable cutoff scores in place, we must now consider the channeling 
rules that describe how the aspects of a multifaceted person combine to predict the odds 
of leader success in this domain. A two-way ANOVA was carried out to gain an 
understanding of the initial performance data for each of the nine personalities 
conceptualized by the factorial combination of the three-levels of power and the three-
levels of achievement motivation. While the ANOVA indicates that only achievement 
motivation is a significant predictor of graduation, researchers with knowledge of these 
individual differences and the domain see differences in performance across personality 
types that are both compelling and explainable (see Figure 7 and Tables 17 & 18 on p. 77 
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and 78). Here again, leader personality types are judged based on the likely personality 
dynamics and initial performance data, and labeled as leaders likely to succeed (LLS), 
fail (LLF), or perform at the mean (LLM).  
Leaders Likely to Succeed (LLSs – as scored by CRT-L & RMS)  
First, consider “power-driven AMs” (PO-AM). PO-AMs graduated at a rate of 
56% in a sample where the graduation rate was 33% (see Table 17, p. 78). PO is a strong 
approach motive with social consequences which remain controversial (Allport, 1928; 
Winter, 1973; Kipnis, 1976b, 1976a; Winter, 2002; Overbeck, 2010). As discussed in 
Chapter 3, AM is strong approach motive with consequences which are often positive 
(Allport, 1937; McClelland, 1985; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James & LeBreton, 2012). 
Recall that when AMs, in the context of their chosen domain, encounter situations 
requiring they achieve important and difficult objectives, they are likely to experience 
arousal, attraction and an implicit desire to approach (i.e. engage). POs function similarly 
in that, when placed in a situation affording them the opportunity to take control, be 
influential or assume responsibility, they are likely to experience arousal, attraction and 
an implicit desire to approach/engage (Allport, 1937; Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1985). 
POs are not necessarily driven by responsibility itself but in the context of their chosen 
domain, will seek and accept it in order to gain the power (James et al., 2011, in press). 
In Ranger School, PO-AMs encounter both an opportunity to achieve, and 
situations requiring they lead (e.g. take control, be influential and accept responsibility). 
PO-AMs are cognitively and emotionally prepared for both of these aspects of the Ranger 
School experience. They are implicitly comfortable with power, driven to take charge, 
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and focused on accomplishing that which others are either unwilling or unable to do. All 
things being equal, the PO-AM is a leader we should bet on. 
Next, consider two personalities: the “non-PO AM” (nPO-AM; graduation rate: 
46%); and the power-driven non-AM (PO-nAM; graduation rate: 40%). The nPO-AM 
does not have a strong power motive but, as described above, is not submissive. That is, 
they may not seek power/responsibility, but neither do they experience a strong implicit 
aversion to it. In contrast, the PO-nAM does not have a strong achievement motive, but 
as described above, is no FF. That is, they may not be driven to achieve, but neither do 
they have a strong aversion to situations putting them at risk of failure. Given the 
similarities between these two personalities and the previously described PO-AM, it is 
likely that similar personality dynamics are in play. That is, in Ranger School, leaders of 
these three personality types find themselves in a situation which matches their 
dispositions reasonably well. This in combination with the initial performance data 
causes me to classify these three personalities as LLS. That is, in this particular poker 
game, we can see only two cards of any given leader’s hand. If one of those cards 
indicates a strong approach motive of either type (PO or AM), and the other card is not at 
a level which is a disability then we are peering over the shoulder of a leader we should 
bet on. Again, relative to the other personality types we might select, these three are more 
likely to win. 
Leaders Likely to Fail (LLFs – as scored by CRT-L & RMS)  
Of those likely to fail, first consider the “submissive FF” (SU-FF; graduation rate: 
23%).  Recall from Chapter 3 that, when placed in a situation requiring they achieve 
important and difficult objectives, FFs experience anxiety, implicit aversion and are 
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driven to avoid or escape that situation. SUs function similarly in that, when placed in a 
situation affording them the opportunity to take control, be influential and accept 
responsibility, they are likely to experience anxiety, aversion and an implicit desire to 
avoid or escape that situation (James et al., 2011, in press). Briefly stated, SUs are like 
POs, but in reverse. In POs: strong implicit needs for power/control drive them to seek 
and accept positions of responsibility. In SUs: a strong aversion for responsibility (i.e. 
their implicit fear of being held responsible) drives them to seek subtle, socially 
acceptable ways of allowing power to pass to others (i.e. those more willing to shoulder 
the responsibility). 
The fact that 30 of 415 incoming students at the US Army Ranger School were 
SU-FFs could be interpreted as a lack of self-insight. There are those who, while pursuing 
other motives, have unwittingly convinced themselves and others they are leaders (or 
simply find themselves in positions that require they lead). These ‘pseudo-leaders’ may 
be high in relevant abilities, and may have any number of excellent attributes but their 
implicit motives are not those of an effective leader – especially not 'at the sharp end of 
the spear'. Leaders like these are often tolerated in mundane settings but under stress (or 
when lives are at risk) they are more likely to fail because, implicitly, they are 
conforming and avoidant - not only of power/responsibility but also of any situation 
putting them at risk of failure. 
Next, consider the “power-driven FF” (PO-FF; graduation rate: 25%). When PO 
& FF are combined in the same individual, we find an important approach motive in 
conflict with an important avoidance motive. PO-FFs likely vacillate between being 
driven by their need to be important, have power and be in control; and their implicit 
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aversion to situations placing them at risk of failure. PO-FFs are likely most satisfied 
when exercising authority in relatively unimportant contexts. In laymen’s terms, they are 
well-suited to be ‘big fish in small ponds’. While the military, like any large bureaucracy, 
can surely find organizational roles to accommodate this personality disposition, it 
appears (i.e. judging from the initial performance data) that leading US Army Rangers is 
not one of them. 
Finally, consider the “non-PO fear-of-failure” (nPO-FF; graduation rate: 25%). In 
view of the preceding two personalities, the nPO-FF might be described as residing 
somewhere between ‘flawed’ and ‘inferior’. Taken together, these three personalities are 
an excellent illustration of the poker paradigm. On page 26-27, I described how a poker 
card that would normally be considered an important strength can be meaningless if it is 
held in combination with certain weaknesses. These three personalities demonstrate that 
phenomenon: if a leader is an AM being a PO is an important advantage. But if an FF, 
one’s level of power motive is relatively meaningless (see Figure 7, p. 77). While 
qualitative personality dynamics like those described in this section must be substantiated 
by further research, I believe these are reasonable. This combined with initial 
performance data causes me to classify these three personalities as LLFs. 
Leaders Likely to Perform at the Mean (LLMs – as scored by CRT-L & RMS)  
Of those likely to perform at the mean, first consider the “submissive AM” (SU-
AM; graduation rate: 31%). SU-AMs benefit to a degree from their strong need for 
achievement. Their implicit aversion to responsibility means they are likely to rationalize 
the act of allowing power to pass to others, but they are likely to be eager, hardworking 
and participative individuals. When they are appointed formal leader, informal power 
49 
structures are likely to become more important determinants of organizational 
performance. They are likely mission focused, with subordinates who feel empowered, 
but they are likely to be indecisive under pressure - especially when the way forward is 
unclear, controversial or the moment requires they personally make a decision for which 
they alone will be held responsible. That said, when the other members of the squad were 
appointed formal leader, they were likely confident, cooperative, likeable team players. 
Next, consider the “submissive non-AM” (SU-nAM; graduation rate: 30%). In 
this domain, SU-nAMs are not strikingly dissimilar from SU-AMs. They may lack a 
strong achievement motive, but they are not FFs.  Briefly stated, it appears their moderate 
level of achievement motivation makes the SU-nAM a mixed bag in ways which are 
likely similar to that described for the SU-AM. 
Finally, consider the non-PO non-AM (nPO-nAM; graduation rate: 31%). In these 
personalities, the available measures identified no strong implicit motives. They are not 
especially driven by power, nor are they especially averse to it. They are not especially 
driven by achievement, nor are they dominated by a fear of failure. In these cases, given 
the measures available, it is difficult to postulate a set of personality dynamics pointing to 
an increased (or decreased) likelihood of success or failure, relative to the mean of their 
similarly situated peers. While the qualitative personality dynamics I’ve described 
regarding the three preceding personalities must be substantiated by further research, I 
believe them to be reasonable. This combined with the initial performance data leads me 
to classify them as LLMs. 
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Trends & Findings Based on Configural Scoring of Leader Personalities (N=415) 
  Analyzing the data in light of the configural scoring paradigm described above, 
readers will notice certain trends. For example, those labeled ‘likely to succeed’ are three 
personalities and comprise 25.8% of the sample (see Table 17, p. 78). Those ‘likely to 
fail’ are also three personalities, and comprise 28.4% of the sample. The subset labeled 
‘likely to perform at the mean’ also contains three personalities, constituting the 
remaining 45.8% of the sample. As in Chapter 3, these descriptive statistics make sense 
in that we might expect only a subset of personalities to be better suited to lead in this 
domain. Similarly, we might expect a subset of similar size to have personality flaws that 
inhibit their leadership. Finally, we might expect a sizable subset to have personalities 
which are largely benign, relative to those of their higher and lower-performing peers. 
Attrition 
Turning our attention to evaluating differences in attrition across these groups, chi 
square analyses indicate that, in this part of the sample, the odds that an LLS would 
graduate were more 2.6 times those of an LLF, χ2 (2, N=415) = 12.27, p = .002 (see Table 
19, p. 78). The odds that an LLF would be dismissed from the course for medical reasons 
were 5.4 times that of an LLS, L.R.(2, N=415) = 6.54, p = .038 (see Table 20, p. 79).13  
To appreciate this difference, one must realize that during the physically brutal 61 days of 
Ranger School, it is difficult to find an individual who (in addition to hunger, muscle 
                                                 
 
 
13 In this analysis χ2 (2, N=415) = 5.51, p = .06. Typically, the Likelihood Ratio and Pearson chi-squares 
agree. But they do not in this particular analysis because the Pearson assumes all the variables are 
categorical. Since here the predictor (3 levels) and the outcome variable (2 levels) are both ordinal, the 
Likelihood Ratio is actually the more appropriate, more powerful test (Wickens, 1989; Aspelmeier & 
Pierce, 2009). For the sake of detail: the linear-by-linear association test value was 5.2 on 1 df, p = .02. 
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fatigue and sleep deprivation) is not also struggling daily with one or more sprains, pains 
or other sicknesses. But (as high school football coaches often tell their players) one can 
perceive himself as 'hurt' (translation: 'I can still play') or one can perceive himself as 
'injured' (meaning ‘I cannot’). Sometimes perceptions of injury are veridical. Sometimes 
they serve as socially acceptable excuses to go sit on the sideline (i.e. to escape this 
physically and psychologically uncomfortable situation). For example: early in the course 
one participant (an LLS from a large southern state) contracted a medical condition 
which is common among soldiers in the field who endure physically demanding tasks 
without the benefit of a daily shower. The medical term is “Scrotal Celulitis” but its 
moniker among soldiers is ‘crotch rot’. He sought medical attention but as the condition 
grew more painful, would not leave the course. You can imagine the horror of medical 
providers when they realized his case of scrotal celulitis had blossomed into a case of 
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA).14  This southerner was an extreme 
AM (combined with nPO), and even after being fully informed of the threat (see 
footnote), he only left the training because the commander ordered his removal and 
promised he could return after the threat of scrotal amputation had been abated. In 
contrast, LLF medical drops commonly left the course for medical reasons that were not 
specifically annotated in their training records. As the likelihood ratio chi-square of the 
data clearly indicates, sometimes the distinction between a self-perception of 'hurt' vs. 
'injured' depends on one's implicit personality. 
                                                 
 
 
14 MRSA is a serious and debilitatingly painful infection, caused by a strain of staph bacteria that’s become 
resistant to the antibiotics commonly used to treat ordinary staph infections. If treatment of MRSA is not 
timely and aggressive, it can result in the amputation of the afflicted appendage. 
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During the first three days of Ranger School, a particularly unforgiving form of 
attrition takes place known as ‘Ranger Assessment’. During ‘assessment’, students 
complete a series of events designed to test physical fitness and technical job proficiency 
(e.g. a physical fitness test, survival swimming test, day and night wilderness orienteering 
tests, a 5-mile run, 12-mile foot march, and two challenging obstacle courses). Physical 
ability is important, but whether or not one survives assessment is also a function of how 
well that person prepared themselves during the months prior to Ranger School.  Chi-
square analyses indicate that the odds an LLF would be removed from the course within 
the first 3-days were more than 3.5 times that of an LLS χ2 (2, N=415) = 20.93, p < .001 
(see Table 21, p. 79). Finally, since the Ranger School commander often cites multiple 
reasons for dismissing a leader from the course, I summed the number of reasons cited 
for each leader to create a ratio scale dependent variable. I analyzed each leader’s 
‘number of reasons cited for dismissal’ in an ANOVA to assess group differences. On 
average, LLFs and LLMs were dismissed for a significantly higher number of reasons 
than LLSs, F(2, 415) = 7.721, p = .001 (see tables 22 and 23, on p. 79). Planned repeated 
contrasts revealed that, while LLFs did not significantly differ from LLMs (95% CI for 
the difference [-.052, .239], p = .205), on average both LLFs and LLMs were dismissed 
for a significantly higher number of reasons than LLSs (95% CI for the difference 
between LLM and LLS [.078, .378], p = .003). 
While implicit personality was related to these 4 dependent variables describing 
graduation and attrition, in the other 4 variables I found no statistically significant 
relationship. In this part of the sample, chi-square analyses indicated no difference across 
groups in the odds of: 1) being dismissed from the course for poor leadership of mission 
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patrols, χ2 (2, N=415) = 1.277, p = .528; 2) quitting, χ2 (2, N=415) = .392, p = .822; 3) 
being ‘peered’ out of the course, χ2 (2, N=415) = 1.87, p = .393; or 4) being removed 
from the course for cheating or other egregious conduct, χ2 (2, N=415) = 2.466, p = .291. 
See Tables 24-27, on pp. 80 and 81.15 
Leader Performance 
We’ve already seen in the attrition analyses that the odds a leader would be 
dismissed from the course for poor mission leadership did not depend upon his 
personality (see above). But the odds a leader would pass a given phase of the training 
did depend on his personality. That is, the odds an LLS would pass a given phase of the 
training were 2.25 times better than those of an LLF, χ2 (2, N=785) = 16.762, p < .001 
(see Table 28, p. 81).    
Peer Evaluations 
 With respect to peer evaluations, the attrition analyses already indicated that the 
odds of being ‘peered out’ of the course were not significantly related to implicit 
personality (see above). But, in this part of the sample, the odds a leader would pass any 
given peer evaluation also did not depend on his personality, χ2 (2, N=538) = .671, p = 
.715; see Table 29, on p. 81). 
 
                                                 
 
 
15 To parallel the analyses in Chapter 3, if we repeat the chi-square of attrition due to leadership failure (and 
peer evaluation failure) considering only the 198 leaders who survived long enough to lead a patrol (and 
face a peer evaluation) then the difference is still statistically insignificant, χ2 (2, N=198) = .163, p = .922 
(for peer evaluation failure, χ2 (2, N=198) = .767, p = .681). 
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Summary (CRT-L & CRT-RMS, N=415)  
The analyses conducted above indicate that: a) implicit personality is predictive of 
leader performance and attrition, but was not significantly related to peer evaluations in 
this part of the sample; and b) the ‘configural scoring’ analysis again yielded findings that 
were misrepresented or hidden by the linear and interactive logistic regressions conducted on 
the continuous personality scores. Comparing these results to those from the other sample 
(see Chapter 3), it is not clear why, for example, differences in the odds of ‘attrition due 
to peer evaluation failure’ were significant in the smaller sample (where aggression was a 
predictor) but not significant in the larger sample (where the power motive was a 
predictor). This may simply be due to the fact that the measure of power motive (CRT-L) 
is in a much earlier stage of development than either CRT-A or CRT-RMS. Then again, it 
may suggest that leader personalities flawed for reasons involving aggression (or conflict 
avoidance) are likely to be identified by the people around them, but those flawed for 
reasons involving power (or submissiveness) are more likely to fail for other reasons. 
In conclusion, as we saw in Chapter 3, when viewed over time the relationships 
between implicit personality and the odds of leader success are apparent (see Figure 8, p. 
82). Further, when we compare the personality composition of the group of leaders who 
graduated to that which began the course, we see that on ‘Day 0’, LLSs were roughly 
equal in number to the LLFs, and LLMs made up nearly half the class. But of those still 
standing on graduation day, LLSs equal LLMs, and the portion of LLFs has been 





SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, & FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study measured the implicit personalities of 627 leaders entering the military’s most 
challenging and stressful combat leader development course. These 627 leaders were 
divided in two sub-samples: one sample of 212 and another of 415. Assessing the 
empirical results across both samples, it is clear that the 18 different personality types 
described by combinations of scores on CRT-A and RMS (in the sample of 212), and 
CRT-L and RMS (in the sample of 415) systematically differed in their leadership and 
attrition. Further, in the sample of 212, implicit personalities also differed in the 
evaluations received from their peers during the course. 
 Further, alternative analyses demonstrated that these findings would have been 
misrepresented or hidden by linear regressions conducted on continuous scores. As an 
alternative, I presented a configural scoring scheme, couched in a poker analogy, to 
explain how these individual differences combine to predict the odds of success of each 
of the 18 personality types studied. Scoring personalities in this way is an inherently 
interactional approach, as it requires knowledge not only of individual differences, but 
also of the way they play out in the domain. Situational, follower, and organizational 
differences might mean that predicting effective leaders in one domain requires we 
evaluate (for example) eight predictors, where some other domain may require fewer or 
different predictors. One example that comes to mind is, if we were to switch from 
predicting effective leaders for elite military forces to predicting effective leaders in 
typical office environments, then the importance of physical aptitude would drop in 
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importance from ‘more important’ to 'largely irrelevant'. Similarly, if selecting someone 
to lead a team of diplomats seeking to avert (or end) a war, perhaps a CAP-AM would 
have the highest odds of success. But this is nothing new to poker. Rules can change from 
one variation of the game to another, and sometimes even deuces are wild. That does not 
change the possibility that an understanding of leadership, like an understanding of poker, 
can be built upon a single underlying system of ordinal measurement, and a set of 
channeling rules that is alterable to describe different variations of the phenomenon. 
Regarding the measurement of predictors, conditional reasoning is both valuable 
and exciting for those who study leadership. Future research should focus on continued 
development of CRT-L. I anticipate more fascinating results as improved versions of this 
measure are employed. Ongoing work to develop a conditional reasoning test for 
narcissism/selfishness vs. humility is also worthwhile and exciting. However, conditional 
reasoning is probably not a panacea.16 It seems most promising when psychologists seek 
to differentiate between people who are dispositionally driven by one of two, 
diametrically opposed but fundamental human motives. Additionally, it is especially 
effective when at least one of the motives under scrutiny is a personality disposition 
people are likely to hide from themselves and/or others. When one’s dispositions are 
largely unstated, unrecognized or unconscious, an indirect approach is likely to yield 
better measures than direct self-reports (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Funder, 1980; 
McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Leary & Kowalski, 1990; John & Robins, 
                                                 
 
 
16 For example, the Army Research Institute (ARI) largely failed in its attempt to develop a conditional 
reasoning measure of ‘team orientation’ (see O'Shea, Driskell, Goodwin, Zbylut, & Weiss, 2004). 
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1994; Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, & Powell, 1995; Barrick & Mount, 1996; Rosse, Stecher, 
Miller, & Levin, 1998; Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999; Schwarz, 1999; Snell, Sydell, 
& Lueke, 1999; Zickar & Robie, 1999; Jo, 2000; Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; 
Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006; Holden, 2007; Morgeson et al., 
2007; Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 2007). 
Meanwhile, new data sets are needed to validate and improve the poker paradigm 
as a system for scoring leader implicit personality (and eventually other individual 
differences) as predictors of effective leadership in stressful (and eventually in 
dangerous) military settings. Still other data sets might explore the similarities and 
differences between the ways implicit motives and other individual differences interact to 
predict leadership in stressful military settings and the way these might interact to predict 
leadership in other domains.  
Interestingly, in the domain studied here, the poker paradigm identified only one 
of the three measured constructs as a simple and unconditional leadership asset: 
achievement motive. In contrast, strong power motives were observed to be important 
assets in those with coexistent achievement motives, but meaningless in those dominated 
by fear of failure. Aggression, if assessed alone, had a curvilinear relationship with 
leadership effectiveness such that the moderately aggressive were more likely to be 
effective than either the highly aggressive or the conflict avoidant. But, in the context of 
the right poker hand, extremely high or low levels of aggression could be either an asset 
or a liability. Specifically, highly aggressive, high achievement motive individuals were 
likely to be effective, but aggression combined with fear-of failure appears to be the mark 
of a leader likely to fail. Similarly, a conflict avoidant/pro-social disposition combined 
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with a strong achievement motive is suspected to identify individuals who are probably 
essential to the establishment and maintenance of functional intrapersonal norms and 
processes within elite military teams. But the same conflict avoidant/pro-social 
disposition in individuals without a strong achievement motive meant they were likely to 
fail. When it comes to understanding the individual differences profiles of people who are 
likely to be effective leaders in a given domain, I suspect we have yet to fully grasp how 
predictor variables rank in importance. Nor have we fully investigated how those 
variables (and ranges of scores on those variables) channel each other to describe a 
person that we should bet on versus someone who is, in all probability, a loser.  
But we can start by proposing and testing a set of cutoff scores and channeling 
rules that we think are reasonable in the given domain. Having applied this approach to 
study leaders in a challenging and stressful military setting, I believe it is quite promising. 
Overall, I think these findings argue that individual differences can be reliable predictors 
of leader effectiveness. As in poker (where a royal flush is reliably considered 'the nut 
hand’), a leader with four kings (e.g. intellectually gifted, driven by achievement and 
power, with a lot of domain specific knowledge) is a solid bet in most situations. This 
being the case, future systems for the prediction of effective leaders should acknowledge, 
and include both measures and features to account for the fact that effective leaders are 
not only “born” and “made” but also exist within specific domains. 
While the results of this study are encouraging, they must be interpreted in the 
context of the study’s limitations. First, even if additional data sets validate, augment and 
improve the prediction system, it would not technically prove that these individual 
differences are a cause of effective leadership in this domain. Predictive relationships 
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exist, but use of the word “cause” will require research employing different 
methodologies and/or analyses. This is a significant issue, as the phenomenon tends to be 
obscured by statistical analyses employing linear combinations and partial regression 
coefficients. This being the case, causal SEM models (for example) may not be a viable 
solution. At this time, this is a methodological issue I am not sure how to solve. 
A second limitation of this study is its reliance on perceptual measures. Each 
participant’s leadership position grades and peer evaluations depended on the perceptions 
of raters. While perceptual measures are flawed, they are meaningful, especially when 
they are provided by raters with the knowledge and opportunity to make expert 
judgments (Feldman, 1986, 1994). Also, in a study such as this, the validity of such 
judgments is not likely to be replicated or exceeded by any reasonably attainable set of 
objective, analytic performance measures (Feldman, 1992). Further, these measures have 
practical significance, as they determine real outcomes (i.e. leaders graduated or not 
based in large part on the perceptual measures obtained from their RIs and squadmates). 
Finally, in other research when similar raters made similar judgments, the perceptual 
measures had better validities than a set of carefully chosen objective measures 
(Goldstein & Bartlett, 1977; Goldstein & Ford, 2002, p. 156)17. 
Thirdly, the extreme demands of this combat leadership course have been 
interpreted to underwrite the assumption that students are in a stressful and relatively 
dangerous environment. This assumption does not hold during every moment of the 61-
                                                 
 
 
17 Police academy graduates were asked ‘Which five members of your recruit class would you most like to 
have as your back up if you were to find yourself in a dangerous situation’. Participant responses predicted 
subsequent job performance better than the grades recruits received during their police academy training. 
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day course, and it may not hold for all participants. In a manner similar to ‘situational 
strength’ (see Smith, 2011), ‘stress’ and ‘danger’ are best defined as characteristics of a 
person in a situation. Tasks that are stressful or dangerous for one (e.g. a novice soldier) 
may be less so to another (e.g. an expert soldier).18 In a given environment, the former 
may experience fear or be performing at maximum capacity, while the latter is 
unconcerned and comfortably pacing himself. Yet, environments exist which elicit 
significant perceptual agreement (i.e. while reactions vary across individuals, all 
participants feel significantly challenged and realize they are participating in tasks which, 
if performed poorly, could result in serious injury or death). Given the demands of 
Ranger School (described on pp. 12-14), the latter description is the more valid. While 
individual perceptions of stress and danger are dynamic across individuals and situations, 
an exploration of that important topic is beyond the scope of this study. 
Finally, while results support an interactionist theoretical perspective, important 
individual differences went unmeasured (e.g. domain relevant knowledge and abilities). 
In addition, the research design did not measure or manipulate the situation. This study 
cannot validate an overarching interactionist theory of effective leadership. But it does 
offer evidence that implicit personality is predictive of individual leadership and attrition 
during an extremely stressful military combat leadership course. This evidence argues for 
a more purposeful investigation of fundamental individual differences as part of an 
interactionist theory for predicting effective leadership in this and in other domains.
                                                 
 
 




The US Army Ranger School Peer Evaluation Scoring System 
1.1 Peer Evaluations 
1.1.1 6-5-1.  Purpose 
a. To provide guidance for the academic criteria for, execution of, and 
counseling regarding, the student end of phase Peer Reports. 
1.1.1 6-5-2.  Execution 
a. The United States Army Ranger School Peer Evaluation System as adopted 
by the Ranger Training Brigade, April 2000 as follows: 
b. Methods and Principles: 
 (1) The Peer Evaluation System (PES), (Figure 6F and 6G) evaluates an 
individual Ranger student performance in comparison to that Ranger’s peers’ 
performances within their squad. 
 (2) The methodology employs a modified numerical scale peer ranking 
system (forced distribution) based on the principles of the Ranger creed to 
pinpoint reasons for success/failure and used to identify and track individuals “on 
the bubble.”  It is a collated system of all peer scores within the squad highest to 




Peer Evaluation System 
NUMBER OF RANGERS IN THE SQUAD
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0
9 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0
10 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0
11 -1 -1 -1 -1 0
12 -1 -1 -1 -1







Peer Evaluation System 
 
 
 (3) The PES Form (Figure 6H) provides a scale by which Rangers must 
numerically rank their peers within the squad, and also requires commentary on 
















NUMBER OF RATING SQUAD MEMBERS 
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
15 100 
14 100 98 
13 100 98 97 
12 100 98 98 95 
11 100 98 96 95 93 
10 100 98 96 91 93 92 
9 100 98 96 91 92 91 90 
8 100 97 95 93 92 90 89 88 
7 100 97 94 93 91 90 88 88 87 
6 96 94 92 90 89 88 87 86 85 
5 93 91 89 88 86 85 85 84 83 
4 89 88 86 85 83 83 83 82 82 
3 86 84 83 83 82 81 81 80 80 
2 82 81 81 80 80 79 79 79 78 
1 79 78 78 78 77 77 77 77 77 
0 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
-1 71 72 72 73 73 73 73 73 73 
-2 68 69 69 70 70 71 71 71 72 
-3 64 66 67 68 68 69 69 70 70 
-4 61 63 64 65 66 67 67 68 68 
-5 57 59 61 63 65 65 65 66 67 
-6 54 56 58 60 61 63 63 64 65 
-7 50 53 56 58 59 60 62 63 63 
-8 50 53 55 57 58 60 61 62 
-9 50 53 55 56 58 59 60 
-10 50 52 54 56 57 58 
-11 50 52 54 55 57 
-12 50 52 54 55 
-13 50 52 53 








(4) The PES is based on the “TOP THIRD, MIDDLE THIRD, BOTTOM 
THIRD” concept.  Each Ranger’s individual ranking is measured against a table 
broken down into “top third, middle third, bottom third” relative to the number of 
Rangers in that squad.  Those Rangers rated in the top third are awarded a “+1” 
rating, a “0” rating for the middle third, and a “-1” rating for the bottom third 
(Figure 6-16-1).  The total of these ratings is compared to the total score table 
(Figure 6-16-2). Given that the lowest possible peer score for any given number 
of Rangers in a squad is “50”, and the highest possible peer score is “100”, a total 
tally peer score of “0” is equivalent to a peer percentage score of “75”. 
c. Student Execution: 
 (1) The Ranger students will fill out peer ranking bubble chart according to 
instructions given.  The Ranger students fill out Commentary portion according to 
instructions given. 
 (2) Peer Ranking Portion:  Students will rate his squad members according 
to their overall performance.  Students will rate all members in the squad 
excluding himself.  Students will assign a number position under the Peer Ranking 
portion according to the student’s performance within the squad, e.g., The best 
Ranger in the squad will receive the number 1; the worst in a ten man squad will 
receive a nine (remember, the student does not rate himself).   
 (3) Commentary:  Students will provide their comments regarding the rated 
Ranger’s performance in the six categories shown.  These categories are basic 
principles of the Ranger Creed, and are designed to offer insight into the finer 
points of a Ranger’s performance, thereby providing the Commander with specific 
references to support counseling of that Ranger. Students are required to 
complete this section. 
 (4) Ranger Instructor Execution:  The instructions of the Student Peer 
Evaluation Report are read to the students verbatim.  Students are briefed that 
they will apply only their roster number to the report, and that by doing so they are 
acknowledging that their comments were made objectively and impartially, and 
were not shown to or discussed with others.  Students fall under the Honor Code 
when they sign their name to the report.  Students are prohibited from 
collaborating with other students to attempt to subvert the peer system.  All rating 
forms are checked for compliance with these instructions when they are turned in.  
Once all rating forms are complete, the Ranger Instructor executes the following: 
 (5) Ranger Instructor tabulates squad’s peer scores using peer ranking 
table (Table 2).  The Ranger Instructors determine if any squad members have 
failed to achieve 60% (GO).  Those Rangers that fail to achieve the minimum 
standard of 60% are designated as “Peer Failures” and are handled according to 
the provisions of Annex I. 
 (6) When the entire squad’s individual peer scores have been calculated, 
the Ranger Instructor may complete the following: 
 (a) Order the scores achieved within the squad highest to lowest. 
 (b) Marking only the top Peer Score Sheet, RI may indicate the ranking 
of that individual within the squad, based upon peer score alone. 
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 (c) NOTE:  This is not required, but may be helpful to commanders that 
wish to determine an individual’s status relative to the squad, and further assist 
the commander’s counseling process at all levels. 
 (d) Once tabulated and complete, the Ranger’s Peer Report Packet is 
placed in the student‘s academic record folder IAW Annex C. 
 (7) Company Commander Execution/Counseling:  Any Ranger student that 
achieves a peer score of less than 60% is recorded as a “Peer Failure”.  These 
individuals must be counseled by the Ranger company commander both verbally 
and in writing: 
 (a) Verbally:  Company commander will review and read the comments 
made by the Ranger’s fellow squad members to the Ranger student as a means 
of highlighting to the Ranger areas in which he must improve to succeed.  
Company commander will take care NOT to reveal the names of the Rangers that 
provided the actual ratings and/or comments that resulted in that Ranger’s failing 
peer score. 
 (b) Written:  Company commander will provide a memorandum stating 
the reasons for counseling a particular Ranger, the date, and provide an 
opportunity for the Ranger to signify his agreement and understanding of the 
circumstances, and acknowledgement of the counseling on that same 
memorandum. 
 (c) All counseling and academic documentation will be retained in the 
Student Academic Folder.  
 (8) Battalion Commander Execution:  Battalion Commander’s will 
adjudicate upon the disposition of any student by means of the Battalion 
Academic Review Board.  
1.1.1 6-5-3.  Standards 
a. A Ranger student must achieve a score of 60% or higher to be recorded as 
a Peer “GO”.  Students achieving scores of less than 60% are recorded as peer 
failures.   
b. First time Peer Failures, the Battalion Commander will adjudicate and 
determine their disposition.  If allowed to go forward, they must be moved, from 
Benning to Mountains different platoon within the company, from Mountains to 
Florida different company within the battalion, before beginning training at the next 
phase.   
c. Multiple Peer Failures, the Battalion Commander will adjudicate and 
determine their disposition IAW Annex I (Academic Review Board Disposition 
Matrix).  In the event that a Ranger student fails peers more than once, he could 
be recommended for Academic Drop by the Battalion Commander. Ranger 
students that have previously recycled do NOT begin again with a clean peer 
slate.  All peer failures count toward the final total.   
d. Peer & another academic area failures (i.e., patrols and/or spots), the 
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Sample Demographic Information (N=627) 
 
Race/Ethnicity Percent N 
Black 5.7% 36 
Hispanic 9.1% 57 
American Indian .3% 2 
White 76.7% 481 
Pacific Islander 1.4% 9 
Asian 3.2% 20 
Multi-racial 2.9% 18 
Other .3% 2 
Declined to Answer .3% 2 






























Logistic Regression Predicting Graduation from CRT-A, CRT-RMS, and their Interaction 
 
                   95% CI of Odds Ratio 
Predictor   B Wald χ2       p       Odds Ratio            Lower              Upper 
CRT-A .066  .367      .545 1.068  .864  1.32 
 
CRT-RMS .026  .104      .747 1.026  .876  1.203 
 














 Descriptive Statistics for Nine Leader Personalities (CRT-A & RMS) 
 
Leader Personality Graduation Rate N Type Relative To Odds of Success (% of Sample) 
AG-AM 54% 13 
LLSs (54 of 212 = 25.5%) 
nAG-AM 51% 41 
AG-nAM 45% 11 
LLMs (107 of 212 = 50.5%) 
nAG-nAM 44% 32 
nAG-FF 38% 13 
CAP-AM 41% 34 
CAP-FF 41% 17 
AG-FF 25% 16 
LLFs (51 of 212 = 24%) CAP-nAM 23% 35 






ANOVA Summary for Group-A, Group-RMS, & Graduation 
 
Source SS df MS F p 
Group-CRT-A .331 2 .166 .691 .502 
Group-CRT-RMS .662 2 .331 1.38 .254 
Group-A x Group-RMS .765 4 .191 .798 .528 
Within 48.68 203 .240   












Odds of Graduation 
(The ratio of grads to failures) Failures Graduates 
LLS 26 28 51.9% 1.08 to 1 
LLM 62 45 42.1% .725 to 1 
LLF 39 12 23.5% .307 to 1 
Overall 127 85 40.1% .669 to 1 



















Odds of Dismissal for  
Poor Leadership Dismissed 
Not 
Dismissed 
LLS 0 54 0% 0 
LLM 6 101 5.6% .059 to 1 
LLF 6 45 11.8% .133 to 1 
Overall 12 200 5.7% .06 to 1 













Odds of Dismissal for  
Poor Leadership Dismissed 
Not 
Dismissed 
LLS 0 33 0% 0 
LLM 6 49 10.9% .122 to 1 
LLF 6 18 25.0% .333 to 1 
Overall 12 100 10.7% .120 to 1 











Quitting Rate Odds of Quitting Quitters Non-Quitters 
LLS 0 54 0% 0 
LLM 1 106 0.9% .009 to 1 
LLF 3 48 5.9% .063 to 1 
Overall 4 208 1.9% .019 to 1 











Serious Observation Report? 
SOR Dismissal Rate Odds of SOR Dismissal SOR Not an SOR 
LLS 0 54 0% 0 
LLM 3 104 2.8% .029 to 1 
LLF 5 46 9.8% .109 to 1 
Overall 8 204 3.8% .039 to 1 






ANOVA Summary for ‘Number of Reasons Cited for Dismissal’ & Leader Personality 
 
Source SS df MS F p 
Personality Type 4.29 2 2.147 5.348 .005 
Within 83.90 209 4.01   






Mean ‘Number of Reasons for Dismissal’ by Leader Personality 
 
Leader Personality M SD N 
LLSs .46 .539 54 
LLMs .70 .676 107 
LLFs .86 .633 51 










Peer Failure Peer Failure 
Attrition Rate 
Odds of Attrition  
Due to Peer Failure ‘Peered Out’ Not ‘Peered Out’ 
LLS 2 52 3.7% .038 to 1 
LLM 6 101 5.6% .059 to 1 
LLF 1 50 2.0% .020 to 1 
Overall 9 203 4.2% .044 to 1 












Ranger Assessment Event Failure 
Attrition Rate 
Odds of Attrition  
Due to Event Failure Failed Did Not Fail 
LLS 21 33 38.9% .636 to 1 
LLM 52 55 48.6% .945 to 1 
LLF 27 24 52.9% 1.13 to 1 
Overall 100 112 47.2% .893 to 1 











Med-Attrition Rate Odds of Medical Attrition Med-Drop Not Med-drop 
LLS 2 52 3.7% .038 to 1 
LLM 7 100 6.5% .070 to 1 
LLF 2 49 3.9% .041 to 1 
Overall 11 201 5.2% .055 to 1 











Portion of Training 
Phases Passed 
Odds of Passing Any Given 
Phase of Training 
# of Phases 
Passed # Failed 
LLS 86 45 65.6% 1.91 to 1 
LLM 137 102 57.3% 1.34 to 1 
LLF 45 53 45.9% .849 to 1 
Overall 268 200 57.3% 1.34 to 1 















Portion of Peer 
Evals Passed 
Odds of Passing Any Given 
Peer Evaluation  
# Peer Evals 
Passed 
# Peer Evals 
Failed 
LLS 105 3 97.2% 35.0 to 1 
LLM 162 20 89.0% 8.10 to 1 
LLF 59 7 89.4% 8.43 to 1 
Overall 326 30 91.6% 10.87 to 1 
































Figure 5.  The personality composition of the group of 212 leaders who started Ranger 
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Logistic Regression Predicting Graduation from CRT-L, CRT-RMS, and their Interaction 
 
                   95% CI of Odds Ratio 
Predictor   B Wald χ2       p       Odds Ratio            Lower              Upper 
CRT-L  .069 .557     .455         1.072  .894  1.285 
 
CRT-RMS .068 7.70     .006         1.071  1.020  1.124 
 















 Descriptive Statistics for Nine Leader Personalities (CRT-L & RMS) 
 
Leader Personality Graduation Rate N Type Relative To Odds of Success (% of Sample) 
PO-AM 56% 9 
LLSs (107 of 415 = 25.8%) 
nPO-AM 46% 83 
PO-nAM 40% 15  
SU-AM 31% 42 
LLMs (190 of 415 = 45.8%) SU-nAM 30% 63 
nPO-nAM 31% 85 
PO-FF 25% 24 
LLFs (118 of 415 = 28.4%) nPO-FF 25% 64 
SU-FF 23% 30 






ANOVA Summary for Group-L, Group-RMS, & Graduation 
 
Source SS df MS F p 
Group-CRT-L .512 2 .256 1.17 .310 
Group-CRT-RMS 1.48 2 .740 3.39 .035 
Group-A x Group-RMS .498 4 .125 .571 .684 
Within 88.58 406 .218   












Odds of Graduation 
(The ratio of grads to failures) Failures Graduates 
LLS 58 49 45.8% .845 to 1 
LLM 132 58 30.5% .439 to 1 
LLF 89 29 24.6% .326 to 1 
Overall 279 136 32.8% .487 to 1 











Med-Attrition Rate Odds of Medical Attrition Med-Drop Not Med-drop 
LLS 2 105 1.9% .019 to 1 
LLM 13 177 6.8% .073 to 1 
LLF 11 107 9.3% .103 to 1 
Overall 26 389 6.3% .067 to 1 










Ranger Assessment Event Failure 
Attrition Rate 
Odds of Attrition  
Due to Event Failure Failed Did Not Fail 
LLS 39 68 36.4% .574 to 1 
LLM 99 91 52.1% 1.09 to 1 
LLF 79 39 66.9% 2.03 to 1 
Overall 217 198 52.3% 1.10 to 1 






ANOVA Summary for ‘Number of Reasons Cited for Dismissal’ & Leader Personality 
 
Source SS df MS F p 
Personality Type 6.16 2 3.08 7.72 .001 
Within 164.28 412 .399   






Mean ‘Number of Reasons for Dismissal’ by Leader Personality 
 
Leader Personality M SD N 
LLSs .55 .602 107 
LLMs .78 .645 190 
LLFs .87 .634 118 















Odds of Dismissal for  
Poor Leadership Dismissed 
Not 
Dismissed 
LLS 7 100 6.5% .070 to 1 
LLM 11 179 5.8% .061 to 1 
LLF 4 114 3.4% .035 to 1 
Overall 22 393 5.3% .056 to 1 











Quitting Rate Odds of Quitting Quitters Non-Quitters 
LLS 2 105 1.9% .019 to 1 
LLM 2 188 1.1% .011 to 1 
LLF 2 116 1.7% .017 to 1 
Overall 6 409 1.4% .015 to 1 










Peer Failure Peer Failure 
Attrition Rate 
Odds of Attrition  
Due to Peer Failure ‘Peered Out’ Not ‘Peered Out’ 
LLS 6 101 5.6% .059 to 1 
LLM 11 179 5.8% .061 to 1 
LLF 3 115 2.5% .026 to 1 
Overall 20 395 4.8% .051 to 1 
















Serious Observation Report? 
SOR Dismissal Rate Odds of SOR Dismissal SOR Not an SOR 
LLS 3 104 2.8% .029 to 1 
LLM 12 178 6.3% .067 to 1 
LLF 4 114 3.4% .035 to 1 
Overall 19 396 4.6% .048 to 1 











Portion of Training 
Phases Passed 
Odds of Passing Any Given 
Phase of Training 
# of Phases 
Passed # Failed 
LLS 153 91 62.7% 1.68 to 1 
LLM 183 159 53.5% 1.15 to 1 
LLF 86 113 43.2% .761 to 1 
Overall 422 363 53.8% 1.16 to 1 











Portion of Peer 
Evals Passed 
Odds of Passing Any Given 
Peer Evaluation  
# Peer Evals 
Passed 
# Peer Evals 
Failed 
LLS 180 19 90.5% 9.47 to 1 
LLM 201 24 89.3% 8.38 to 1 
LLF 105 9 92.1% 11.67 to 1 
Overall 486 52 90.3% 9.35 to 1 





































Figure 9.  The personality composition of the group of 415 leaders who started Ranger 
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